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The amount of information generated in substation automation systems has grown 
exponentially since the introduction of Intelligent Electrical Devices (IED). Until recent 
years substation communication between IEDs was realized with proprietary protocols. 
This led to communication problems in systems with IEDs from different vendors. The 
IEC 61850 standard was introduced in order to harmonize substation communication 
and gain interoperability.  
The IEC 61850 is an international standard defining communication networks and 
systems in substations. The standard defines substation functions, communication 
services and communication between devices as independent units. Thus the standard 
provides an opportunity for redefinition if technology in one area develops. The 
standard divides substation communication into three levels. This study focuses on 
horizontal GOOSE communication between IEDs in bay level and its applications. 
Horizontal communication has conventionally been solved by hardwiring required 
information between devices. GOOSE communication enables the transmission of these 
signals via Ethernet network, therefore creating a system that is more easily expandable 
and reducing the need of hardwiring.  
The purpose of this work is to provide information for ABB Process Industry Plc 
concerning IEC 61850 and GOOSE. The substance of IEC 61850 and horizontal 
communication are presented in the theory chapters. The applications of GOOSE were 
examined in order to get more practical results. The applications were selected based on 
the capabilities of recently introduced REF615 IED. Each application is first described 
in general, followed by an example solution with REF615 IEDs. A fault arc protection 
application was selected for further testing based on an upcoming customer project. 
This application was configured between two REF615 IEDs and the functionality of the 
application was confirmed before the customer project was initiated. 
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Sähköasemien tuottaman informaation määrä on kasvanut merkittävästi älykkäiden 
toimilaitteiden (IED) tultua markkinoille. Viime vuosiin asti sähköaseman laitteiden 
kommunikointi on toteutettu valmistajakohtaisia protokollia käyttäen, jolloin eri 
laitevalmistajien laitteiden välinen kommunikointi on ollut hankalaa toteuttaa. 
Tiedonsiirron yhdenmukaistamiseksi ja eri valmistajien laitteiden yhteentoimivuuden 
saavuttamiseksi esiteltiin IEC 61850 standardi.  
Kansainvälinen IEC 61850 standardi määrittelee tiedonsiirtoverkot ja -järjestelmät 
sähköasemilla. Standardissa sähköaseman toiminnot, kommunikaatiopalvelut ja 
laitteiden välinen kommunikaatio on määritelty kukin erillisenä kokonaisuutena. Täten 
standardi tarjoaa mahdollisuuden uudelleenmäärittelyyn, mikäli teknologia jollakin osa-
alueella kehittyy. Sähköaseman kommunikaatio on standardissa jaettu kolmeen tasoon. 
Tämä diplomityö keskittyy kenttätason horisontaaliseen GOOSE kommunikaatioon ja 
sen sovelluksiin. Perinteisesti horisontaalinen tiedonsiirto on ratkaistu johdottamalla 
tarvittavat tiedot laitteiden välillä. GOOSE kommunikaatio mahdollistaa tilatietojen 
siirtämisen Ethernet-verkkoa pitkin, jolloin johdotuksen tarve vähenee ja järjestelmää 
pystytään tarvittaessa helpommin laajentamaan.  
Työn tarkoituksena on tuottaa ABB Prosessiteollisuudelle tietoa IEC 61850 
standardista ja horisontaalista kommunikaatiosta. Standardin ja horisontaalisen 
kommunikaation keskeiset ajatukset on esitetty teoriakappaleissa. Hyödynnettäviä 
tuloksia varten myös GOOSE kommunikoinnin sovelluksia tutkittiin. Tutkittavat 
sovellukset valittiin äskettäin julkaistun REF615 IED:n toiminnallisuuden perusteella. 
Kukin sovellus kuvataan ensin yleisesti, jonka jälkeen esitetään esimerkkitoteutus 
REF615 releitä käyttäen. Lähestyvän asiakasprojektin perusteella tarkempaan 
testaukseen valittiin valokaarisuojaukseen liittyvä sovellus. Sovellus konfiguroitiin 
kahden REF615 releen välille, jotta sen toimivuus voitiin todentaa ennen 
asiakasprojektin käynnistymistä. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the purpose and background of this study are presented, followed by a 
short history of the IEC 61850 standard. Finally the scope of this study and an outline of 
the chapters are presented. 
1.1. Purpose 
This master’s thesis was initiated by ABB Oy Process Industry Electrification, 
Instrumentation and Composite Plants business unit as a part of a development project. 
The project focuses on standardization of power distribution control based on the IEC 
61850 standard, presented by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The 
IEC 61850 describes communication networks and systems in substations. The focus of 
this master’s thesis is to investigate the possible applications of horizontal 
communication between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). The communication is 
described by IEC 61850 as Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE). [1] 
This master’s thesis provides information about the technological aspects of GOOSE 
communication. 
1.2. Background 
Substation is described as a number of switchgear controlled, supervised and protected 
by a Substation Automation System (SAS). Substation can be divided into three levels, 
which are called station level, bay level and process level. [2] From the perspective of 
process industry, an SAS is essential in order to provide distribution of electricity for 
various types of equipment. Substation automation provides the means for effective, 
reliable and safe distribution of electric energy. 
In recent years the development of substation automation systems has been rapid 
due to the introduction of microprocessor relays. These relays are capable of executing 
several protection and control functions to different devices in the substation.  Modern 
relays can also perform, for example, auto-reclosing and self-monitoring functions, thus 
they are called IEDs. [3] 
Due to the rapid development of IEDs, a vast amount of information is now 
available within a substation and the requirements for communication technology are 
increasing. Up till recent years, vendors have used different communication protocols to 
exchange information inside a substation. This has lead to vendor-specific 
communication solutions, leaving customers depending on the products of the selected 
vendor. Due to vendor-specific communication, interoperability between products from 
different vendors has been either cumbersome or impossible. This problem was 
acknowledged by major vendors in the industry as well as international organizations.  
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In order to gain genuine interoperability and standardize the communication of an 
SAS, IEC published the 61850 standard between 2002 and 2005. The key aspect of the 
standard is to describe communication of an SAS in a way that supports interoperability 
and future solutions in communication and substation automation. The standard presents 
a uniform way to describe data generated in an SAS by decomposing it into smallest 
possible entities that can exchange data. By defining these data models, the transferring 
services and communication protocols, a substation automation system can be described 
uniformly. The principles for these data models, transferring services and protocols are 
presented in this study.  
One of the services for data exchange is horizontal GOOSE communication, which 
can be best described as fast peer-to-peer communication between IEDs. The possible 
applications of this communication can replace present solutions of protection and 
control realized by hardwired schemes. The principles of the most relevant applications 
for the target company's needs are presented within this study. One of these applications 
is described in detail by configuring the required parameters to IEDs and testing the 
GOOSE solution.  
1.3. Scope of the Study 
Due to the publication of the IEC 61850 standard, ABB released a new series of IEDs 
with native support to IEC 61850 communication. The aim of this study is to investigate 
the possible applications of horizontal GOOSE communication for one IED from the 
new Relion® series. The selected IED is REF615, which is designed for feeder 
protection in low and medium voltage switchgear. The REF615 is commonly used for 
industrial power systems protection, and thus the applications based on GOOSE 
communication provide profitable information for ABB Process Industry. The 
examination of more versatile REF630 IED and its applications was also suggested. 
However, the REF630 was not yet available at the beginning of this study. Therefore it 
was not included in this study.  
The outline of this study is as follows. The first chapter provides background 
information for the reader to understand the rationale behind the initiation of this 
master’s thesis. Chapter 2 describes the objective, workflow and information sources 
used in this study. Chapter 3 presents the basis for understanding how substation data is 
described according to the standard. The required communication infrastructure for 
horizontal communication is also presented. In Chapter 4 possible applications are first 
described generally, and then with an example solution with ABB’s REF615 IEDs. 
Information regarding reliability, testing and documentation of GOOSE based solutions 
is also presented. Chapter 5 presents a detailed description of GOOSE implementation 
to ABB IEDs. The required engineering and configuration with software tools, as well 
as the performance of GOOSE communication, are presented. Finally in Chapter 6 the 
outcome of this master’s thesis is presented with proposals to future topics for 
investigation. 
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2. RESEARCH METHODS 
In this chapter the objective of this study is defined, followed by a presentation of the 
workflow of this study. In the final chapter the information sources and research 
methods used in this study are presented. 
2.1. Objective 
This master’s thesis is a part of a development project which focuses on standardization 
of power distribution control (PDC) systems. The focus of this study is on horizontal 
communication between IEDs and its possible applications. The technological benefits 
of the applications compared to conventional solutions are presented based on the 
feedback received from the project team. Important aspects, such as reliability, 
redundancy  and  security,  are  presented  in  order  to  evaluate  the  reliability  of  GOOSE  
solutions compared to conventional solutions. The purpose of this work is to present 
information about the new concept of horizontal communication based on IEC 61850 
standard. Equal importance is given to producing the most suitable applications for 
REF615 IED’s on the framework of Process Industry’s target business markets.   
2.2. Workflow 
At  the  beginning  of  the  study  a  project  team  was  appointed  to  investigate  the  
possibilities to standardize practices used in PDC systems. One part of this project was 
to investigate possible applications of horizontal GOOSE communication, which is the 
subject of this study. After the goals and milestones of this study were specified with 
ABB and approved by Tampere University of Technology, the investigation was 
initiated. 
The investigation of the subject started with collecting reference material about the 
IEC 61850 standard and horizontal communication. The content of this study was 
enunciated after the author had familiarized himself with the standard and discussed 
with the project team.  When the requirements for horizontal communication were 
internalized, ABB provided the author with training about the configuration of IEDs 
including implementation of GOOSE communication. After the required training a 
number of REF615 IEDs were acquired by the project team in order to test and 
demonstrate the implementation of GOOSE communication. The most relevant 
applications for REF615 IEDs were selected to be presented in this study. This was 
achieved by studying reference material and discussing with project engineers. The 
application  of  transferred  arc  protection  trip  was  further  on  selected  to  be  configured  
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and tested. The author acquired the knowledge and skills required for application tests 
by investigating the standard, product manuals, and by participating to relevant ABB’s 
courses. This was followed by an application test, where the transferred arc protection 
trip  application  was  tested  and  also  the  performance  of  GOOSE  communication  was  
noticed. The setting up of the test equipment, the configuration work and the actual 
testing were done in ABB Process Industry’s facilities. After the tests, the principles and 
signals required for all the selected applications were discovered by investigating the 
product manuals and the IEC 61850 standard. The major tasks and workflow of this 
study are depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Workflow of the study. 
 
After the author had done enough research on IEC 61850, the contents of this study 
were enunciated and the writing process begun. After all selected applications were 
introduced and the test completed, the findings of this study were documented for ABB. 
Finally the conclusions of this study were written.  
2.3. Methods and Sources 
Because the IEC 61850 was published between 2003 and 2009, the reference material 
available is vast. Naturally the standard itself is a major source of information, along 
with a number of publications written by experts and scientists worldwide. Most of the 
material was acquired from internet based databases of international organizations, such 
as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). The fact that ABB has 
access rights to major scientific databases concerning electrical engineering was a 
notable contribution. Articles concerning IEC 61850 published in Praxis Profiline were 
very useful at the initial phase of study. Master’s of Science thesis with relevant topics 
were also used as a reference.  
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After the author had familiarized himself enough with the subject, the actual process 
of investigating and writing begun. During this phase the colleagues working at the 
PDC development project were an important source of information. Interviews with 
specialists in the fields of substation automation and process industry electrification 
were also arranged. This provided important perspective and experience to the study. 
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3. IEC 61850 STANDARD 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical background and network 
requirements for GOOSE based applications. At the beginning, an overview of the IEC 
61850 is given, followed by a description of the purpose and objective of the standard. 
The information structure defined by IEC 61850 is presented by introducing the object 
model and data mapping. The services for information exchange are described in 
chapter 3.3.3, followed by a presentation of the substation description language. The 
requirements for network infrastructure are introduced by presenting network topologies 
and component features. The data transfer medium and information security are 
described in the final chapters. 
3.1. Overview 
The history of IEC 61850 began in 1990, when Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) and the IEEE started a project on Utility Communications Architecture (UCA). 
The aim of the UCA-project was to develop both the communication between control 
centers  and  the  communication  from substation  to  control  center.  The  outcome of  the  
project was a standard called IEC 60870-6-TASE.2. In 1994 both EPRI and IEEE 
started working on new standard called UCA2, which focused on the station bus 
communication. In 1996 IEC Technical Committee 57 began working with IEC 61850, 
a standard defining station bus. These two working groups with similar tasks joined 
their forces in 1997, with a goal to create one single standard for station bus 
communication. The result of the combined work is the new international IEC 61850 
standard series, whose latest part was published in 2009. [3; 4] 
The IEC 61850 standard currently consists of fourteen parts, which are presented in 
Appendix 1. Together these parts constitute all the requirements that a substation 
automation system has to fulfill. From the perspective of horizontal communication, the 
IEC 68150-8-1 is the most relevant part in the standard. Due to the vast amount of pages 
and information within the standard, a special reading guide has been composed. This 
guide is meant to point out the relevant parts of the standard to a specific professional. 
The reading guide is presented in Appendix 2. Horizontal communication between IEDs 
and its applications are relevant to both application and communication engineering.  
Therefore, all the parts mentioned in the reading guide are relevant in this context. [5] 
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3.2. Purpose and Objective of the Standard 
The implementation of IEDs has become prevailing in substation automation. Intelligent 
electronic devices are performing all necessary functions inside a modern substation. 
This  requires  efficient  communications  among  the  IEDs,  which  requires  the  use  of  
communications protocols. Before the IEC 61850 standard was released, different 
vendor-specific communication protocols were used to exchange information among the 
IEDs. This means that if different vendors were used, the information would have to be 
converted to the protocol in question. Protocol converters cause delay and increase the 
possibility of errors to the communication process. As the amount of information grows, 
this can potentially create problems within the substation. [3; 6] 
The purpose of the IEC 61850 series is to solve the problems related to different 
communication protocols by introducing a standardized communication protocol. The 
key objectives of the standard are interoperability of IEDs, supporting the operation 
functions and performance requirements of the substation, and supporting future 
technological development. The object of the IEC 61850 is not to standardize the 
functions inside a substation. The functions simply have to be defined in order to 
determine their requirements for the communication. The standard does not define how 
different functions should be allocated in the system. It only specifies the structure and 
communication interface of the functions. Therefore, the standard does not confine the 
development of IEDs or substation automation, and vendors can continue developing 
functionality in their products.  [3; 6; 7] 
3.3. Information Structure in IEC 61850 
Horizontal GOOSE communication between IEDs is based on the IEC 61850 standard. 
Consequently, the reader must understand how data generated in the IEDs is being 
modeled in the standard.  The following chapters present the models for information and 
data used in the standard. [8] 
According to IEC 61850, an SAS can be presented as a combination of three levels: 
station level, bay level and process level. These levels and the possible interfaces 
between them are presented in Figure 2. The numbers within Figure 2 present the 
interfaces of data exchange between different parts of an SAS, which are listed below 
[6]: 
1. Protection data exchange between bay and station level. 
2. Protection data exchange between bay level and remote protection (beyond 
the scope of IEC 61850). 
3. Data exchange within bay level. 
4. Current transformer and voltage transformer instantaneous data exchange 
between process and bay level. 
5. Control-data exchange between process and bay level. 
6. Control-data exchange between bay and station level. 
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7. Data exchange between substation and a remote engineer’s workplace. 
8. Direct data exchange between the bays especially for fast functions such as 
interlocking. 
9. Data exchange within station level. 
10. Control-data exchange between substation and remote control centre 
(beyond the scope of IEC 61850). 
 
Figure 2. A Substation Automation System according to IEC 61850. [6] 
  
This study focuses on horizontal communication, which is referred to by number 8 
in Figure 2. The purpose of horizontal communication is to provide means for IEDs to 
communicate with each other in order to perform, for instance, fast interlocking 
protection schemes within substation. This requires fast and reliable communication, 
also between IEDs from different vendors. 
The IEC 61850 series defines communication by using the OSI-model (Open 
Systems Interconnection). The OSI-model is an internationally standardized (ISO/IEC 
7498-1) model that uses the concept of layering the communication functions. The 
model contains seven layers each of which have defined functional requirements in 
order to create a robust communication system. The OSI-model does not specify which 
protocols should be used in order to achieve the functionality, nor does it restrict the 
solution to a single set of protocols. Therefore, by using the OSI-model the IEC 61850 
series preserves the possibility to change the chosen protocols if technology develops in 
that particular area. [7; 9] The OSI-model is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Communication stack of OSI-model [3; 8] 
 
The actual communication inside an SAS can be divided into three separate parts: 
[10] 
? Data of the applications 
? Services for transferring this data 
? Real communication protocols 
In order to make the communication possible, all of these parts have to be defined. In 
most standards used today these parts are defined together, which creates a unique 
syntax for the messages being transmitted. This makes the data and the services 
dependent from the protocol and also the protocol dependent from the communication 
technology. In IEC 61850 series these parts are all defined separately. If technology in 
one of these parts develops considerably, it is only required to redefine this part to meet 
the state-of-the-art technology. Therefore, the requirement for supporting future 
technology can be achieved. 
Data of the applications is described by an object model. The idea of the object 
model is to decompose data of the substation functions into smallest possible entities, 
which  are  then  used  to  exchange  information.  The  structure  of  the  object  model  is  
described in Chapter 3.3.1. For transferring services an object-oriented concept called 
Abstract  Communication  Service  Interface  (ACSI)  is  used.  To  achieve  actual  
communication, the abstract objects and services need to be mapped to real 
communication protocols. These protocols should be practical to implement and should 
operate in common computing environment of the power industry. The actual 
implementation to real protocols is achieved through Specific Communication Service 
Mappings (SCSM) which is defined in parts 61850-8-1, 61850-9-1 and 61850-9-2 of the 
standard. The information exchange services and mappings to real protocols are 
presented in Chapter 3.3.2. [11] 
3.3.1. Object Model 
Information exchange requires specific data models for data generated in the IEDs. The 
IEC 61850 series uses the concept of virtualization in order to create these data models. 
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Virtualization provides a view of those aspects of a real  device that are of interest  for 
the information exchange with other devices. In the IEC 61850 series only the relevant 
details that are required to provide interoperability are defined. These definitions are 
created by using an object model, which decomposes the functionalities of a real device 
into  the  smallest  possible  entities.  A  good  illustration  of  the  object  model  can  be  
achieved by imagining an IED as a container, which is presented in Figure 4. [12] 
 
 
Figure 4. Object model of IEC 61850 [12] 
 
In the IEC 61850 series object model begins with a physical device (PD). These 
devices are capable of connecting to the network, and are therefore defined by a 
network  address.  Each  PD  has  to  have  a  unique  IP-address  in  order  to  ensure  the  
functionality of the network. A physical device, for instance an IED, consists of one or 
several logical devices (LDs). A logical device is a compound of logical nodes (LNs), 
and each of these logical nodes is related to a specific function inside a substation. At 
least three logical nodes must be within a logical device, namely two LNs related to 
common issues for the logical device (LLN0 and LPHD), and at least one LN 
performing some functionality. A logical node is a grouping of data and services related 
to certain substation function. Therefore, all data generated from the substation can be 
assigned to a certain logical node. A complete list of logical nodes is defined in the IEC 
61850-7-4 and is presented in Appendix 3. In the standard a logical node is specified as 
the smallest entity that can exchange information. Logical nodes are combined into 
groups based on their functionality. These groups and the number of nodes in a group 
are presented in Table 1. At the moment a total of 92 logical nodes are defined in the 
standard. [11; 12] 
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Table 1. Logical node groups [5] 
Symbol Logical node group Number of LNs  
A Automatic control 4 
C Supervisory control 5 
G Generic references 3 
I Interfacing and archiving 4 
L System logical nodes 3 
M Metering and measurement 8 
P Protection functions 28 
R Protection related functions 10 
S Sensors and monitoring 4 
T Instrument transformer 2 
X Switchgear 2 
Y Power transformer 4 
Z Further power system equipment 15 
Total  92 
 
Each logical node contains one or more elements of data. These data elements are 
named according to the standard and are related to a specific purpose in the substation. 
An example of one logical node is given in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. A logical node for circuit breaker; XCBR [13] 
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The XCBR logical node is a model of a circuit breaker and it contains several 
elements of data. The first column describes the name of the data. This name is unique 
and defined by the standard. The second column describes the Common Data Class 
(CDC) to which the data belongs. Part 61850-7-3 of the standard presents all CDCs,  
which are 29 in total. The Explanation column presents a short description of the data 
class in question. If there is a letter T marked in the next column, this informs the 
transient nature of the data class. The last column informs whether the data class is 
mandatory  (M) or optional (O) for the logical node in question. For instance, XCBR 
logical node has a data class Loc, which belongs to a single point status (SPS) common 
data class, is non-transient, and is mandatory. [12; 13] 
The elements of data within a logical node have to conform to the specification of a 
Common Data Class (CDC), as stated above. A common data class is a description of 
the type and structure of the data within a logical node. Each CDC has a defined name 
and a set of attributes, which in turn have a defined name, a defined type and a specific 
purpose. For illustration an anatomy of Single Point Status (SPS) common data class is 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. The anatomy of Single Point Status (SPS) common data class. [14] 
 
 
The table lists all data attributes that belong to common data class SPS. The first and 
second column describe the name and type of the data attribute, respectively. The 
individual attributes of a common data class are grouped into categories by functional 
constrains (FC). The functional constrain of a data attribute is told in the third column. 
The trigger option column (TrgOp) defines when for instance reporting or reading of the 
data will occur. The fourth column describes the predefined values or value range for 
the data attribute. The last column (M/O/C) refers to whether the data attribute is 
mandatory,  optional  or  conditional.  For  instance  the  first  data  attribute  in  Table  3  is  
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named stVal, the type of data is BOOLEAN and it belongs to a functional constrains for 
status  attributes  (ST). The trigger option for stVal is data-change (dchg), and it is 
mandatory (M) for single point status CDC. [3; 11; 12; 14] 
The anatomy of an object name according to IEC 61850 can be easily understood by 
following the data model described in this chapter. An example of such name is 
presented in Figure 5, with explanations. The parts of the object name marked with an 
asterisk (*) are defined by the standard, other parts can be freely allocated according to 
the vendor. According to IEC 61850 the object name can contain 62 marks including 
separation points. The name of the logical node can contain 11 marks including both a 
prefix and a suffix. [3; 8] 
 
 
Figure 5. The anatomy of an object name according to IEC 61850-8-1 [8] 
 
In order to group chosen data attributes or object references of data, the IEC 61850 
defines the concept of a dataset. A dataset is a single collection of object references, 
including data or data attributes organized as a dataset for communication. Because IEC 
61850 defines the object references, the communicating partners shall both 
acknowledge them, therefore only the values and the name of the dataset need to be 
transmitted. Datasets are divided into two types, persistent and non-persistent, which 
relate to the visibility of the datasets. The persistent datasets are visible to any clients of 
Two Party Application Association (TPAA). These include the pre-configured datasets, 
which  are  also  permanent.  The  non-persistent  datasets  are  visible  only  to  the  defined  
client that of the dataset in question. Non-persistent datasets are vital to the functionality 
of GOOSE communication. The chosen data attributes of a GOOSE message have to be 
grouped into a dataset, in order to perform the required function within the substation. 
This is described in Chapter 3.3.3. [12; 15] 
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3.3.2. Data Mapping 
The object model describes all data generated by an IED in an abstract way, preserving 
the direct relation with the functions from which the data is originated. In order to 
transfer this uniformly constructed data, information exchange services have to be 
defined. The IEC 61850 series uses an object-oriented concept called Abstract 
Communication Service Interface (ACSI). The ACSI is very useful, because the 
services are independent of the information content and the communication protocol. 
This service enables all IEDs to behave identically from the perspective of a 
communication network. This way also the services for transferring data are described 
independently. Therefore, the object models and services can be mapped to any 
protocol.  
In the ACSI model there are two groups of communication services. The first group 
uses client-server model, for example to get data values from IEDs. The second group is 
a peer-to-peer model with Generic Substation Event (GSE) services, which are used for 
fast communication between IEDs and periodic sampled value transmissions. These 
services comprise the communication services described by the IEC 61850 series, which 
are listed below: [7; 12] 
? Client-Server Communication 
? Time-critical Sampled Values 
? Time-critical GOOSE Messages 
Client-Server communication works as a service where the client requests data from 
a  server  which  offers  it.  The  server  contains  the  content  of  logical  device,  the  
association model, time synchronization and file transfer, which are defined as 
accessible and visible from the communication network. [12] In the SAS a Client-
Server communication is used for transferring relatively large amounts of information, 
which is not time-critical. This means, for instance, transferring configuration data to 
IEDs. When time-critical information has to be moved, the standard describes two types 
of communication services. These are Sampled Values (SV) for metering information 
and GOOSE messages for fast peer-to-peer communication between IEDs.  
Sampled Values are messages related to instrumentation and measurement. 
Therefore, they are transferred between bay and process levels, as illustrated by number 
4 in Figure 2. The SV messages are time critical and they need to be in chronological 
order. Possible loss of messages also has to be detected. These messages can be sent as 
unicast to one receiver or as multicast for several receivers. [7] The SV messages are 
beyond the scope of this study, and therefore are not described in detail. However, it is 
worth mentioning that as technology migrates to next generation, digital information 
exchange between IEDs and process level devices becomes possible. For instance, 
current transformers can send values digitally via IEC 61850 network. This need has 
been taken into account by defining transmission of SV messages. [11] 
Time-critical GOOSE messages have been defined for fast horizontal 
communication between IEDs. They are used to transfer state and control information 
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between IEDs, for instance trip or locking commands in order to achieve designed 
control  and  protection  schemes.  GOOSE messages  are  transmitted  as  a  multicast  over  
Local Area Network (LAN), from which all IEDs configured to receive the message can 
subscribe it. The demand for fast transmission is obvious, as most protection and control 
schemes depend on fast action of devices. Different message types are presented in 
Table  4.   For  SV  and  GOOSE  messages  this  demand  can  be  achieved  by  a  different  
mapping to real protocols, which are presented next. [7] 
 
Table 4. Types of messages according to IEC 61580 [16] 
Type Name Example 
1a Fast messages – trips Trips 
1b Fast messages – others Commands, simple messages 
2 Medium speed messages Measurement values 
3 Low speed messages Parameters 
4 Raw data messages 
Output data from transducers 
and instrument transformers 
5 File transfer functions Large files 
6a Time synchronization messages a 
Time synchronization,  
station bus 
6b Time synchronization messages b 
Time synchronization,  
process bus 
7 Command messages with access control Commands from station HMI 
 
In order to communicate by using the OSI-model, communication services have to be 
mapped to real communication protocols by using different communication profiles. 
The profiles used in IEC 61850 are presented in Figure 6.  
Basically, in the upper three layers of the OSI-model, the IEC 61850 uses two 
application profiles, the Connection Oriented OSI and Connectionless OSI. For the four 
lower layers of the OSI-model three types of transmission profiles are used, Connection 
Oriented  TCP,  Connection  Oriented  OSI  and  Connectionless  OSI.  The  actual  
communication profiles can be divided into MMS (Manufacturing Message 
Specification) and non-MMS profiles according to IEC 61850-8-1. [8] 
For client-server communication MMS is used. This protocol was originally 
designed for manufacturing, but it was chosen because it has proven to support the 
complex naming and service models of IEC 61850. [11] MMS is an internationally 
standardized messaging system for exchanging real-time data and supervisory control 
information between networked devices and computer applications. [12] MMS covers 
the application profile of the OSI-model, and the transfer and network layers are 
covered either by TCP/IP or ISO. In the perspective of GOOSE messages, client-server 
communication is used only to transfer GOOSE Control Block information during the 
configuration phase of IED engineering. [8] Because client-server communication 
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cannot fulfill the real-time demands of GOOSE-messaging, different communication 
profiles have to be used for time-critical messages. [8; 11; 12;]  
 
 
Figure 6. An overview of functionality and profiles in IEC 61850 [8] 
 
For GOOSE communication Connectionless OSI and non-MMS profiles are used. 
This means that the connection between IEDs prior to sending is not confirmed. The 
GOOSE message is simply sent to the network. This is needed in order to meet the 
time-critical demand of GOOSE communication. As depicted in Figure 6, GOOSE 
messages are mapped directly into the Ethernet data frame in order to eliminate 
processing time of the middle layers. The communication profiles for GOOSE services 
and GSE management are described in part 61850-8-1 Clause 6.3. The protocols and 
services for OSI application profile according to IEC 61850-8-1 are shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Application profile for GOOSE messages and GSE management. [8] 
 
 
As presented in Table 5, the specific GSE/GOOSE protocol is presented in Annex A 
of IEC 61850-8-1, and the Basic Encoding Rules for presentation layer are described in 
ISO/IEC 8824-1 and ISO/IEC 8825-1. The protocols used for OSI transmission profile 
 17 
are illustrated in Table 6. The chosen protocols assure that GOOSE communication can 
meet  the  strict  real-time  demands  of  peer-to-peer  communication  of  IEDs.  These  
protocols among others related to the performance of the network are described in 
Chapter 3.4.2 of this study. 
 
Table 6. Transmission profile for GOOSE messages and GSE-management. [8] 
 
 
In addition to services described earlier, time synchronization and Generic 
Substation Status Event (GSSE) are depicted in Figure 6. Time synchronization 
provides a reference clock for the entire network, which is used, for instance, to have 
sampled values in chronological order. It uses the Simple Network Time Protocol 
(SNTP), which is mapped to the ISO/IEC 8802-3 Ethernet frame via UDP/IP protocols. 
The GSSE provides similar status information as GOOSE, but is merely a list of 
information compared to configurable datasets of GOOSE. [8]  
3.3.3. Information Exchange 
The information exchange with GOOSE messages is established by using a specific 
Generic Substation Event (GSE) model. This model provides the possibility of fast and 
reliable system-wide information exchange of input and output data values. The GSE 
model  presents  an  efficient  method  for  simultaneous  delivery  of  the  same  generic  
substation information for more than one physical device through the use of multicast 
services. According to the standard, the GSE model applies to the exchange of values of 
a collection of data attributes. There are two different message types defined in the 
standard that use the GSE model. The Generic Substation State Event (GSSE) message 
type is able to transfer state change information, which means bit pairs. The GOOSE 
message type can convey a wide range of data attributes organized in a dataset. The 
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major difference between these two message types is that GSSE provides a simple list 
of status information, whereas GOOSE provides a flexible combination of information 
organized into a dataset. Therefore, in GOOSE the information that needs to be 
exchanged can be specified. The actual information exchange is based on a 
publisher/subscriber mechanism. This mechanism along with services is presented in 
Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7. An overview of the classes and services of the GOOSE model. [15] 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7, within a dataset there is a group of data attributes with 
specific functional constrain, for instance st-attr for status. Each of these data attributes 
within a dataset is called Member of  the  dataset,  with  a  MemberReference-numbering 
starting  at  one.  If  any  of  these  data  attributes  change,  the  publisher  will  write  the  
changed values to a transmission buffer. The values are transferred as a GOOSE 
message to the subscriber with a local service Publish.req. Communication mapping 
specific services will transfer the values to a Reception buffer in the subscriber, from 
which they are signaled further on, for instance to perform the application in question. 
[15] 
In a practical perspective, this means that a specific GOOSE control block (GOCB) 
has to be configured for each GOOSE message. This control block includes the 
information which a dataset needs for transmission. The GOOSE control block specifies 
the MAC addresses (Media Access Control) for both the destination and source of the 
GOOSE message. The actual addressing of GOOSE messages is done via MAC 
addresses. The destination address of a GOOSE message contains a multicast MAC 
address, whereas the source address of a GOOSE message contains a unicast MAC 
address. The recommended definitions and limitations of MAC addresses are depicted 
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in Table 7. The first three octets are defined by IEEE, and are 01-0C-CD for GOOSE 
and GSSE messages. The fourth octet in the MAC address defines the type of the 
message. Value 01 is used for GOOSE messages. Finally, the last two octets are used 
for individual addressing of different messages types. The recommended range for 
addressing is presented in Table 7. Recommended MAC address range for GOOSE and 
GSSE messages. [8] 
 
Table 7. Recommended MAC address range for GOOSE and GSSE messages. [8] 
 
Service 
Recommended address range assignments 
Starting address 
(hexadecimal) 
Ending address 
(hexadecimal) 
GOOSE 01-0C-CD-01-00-00 01-0C-CD-01-01-FF 
GSSE 01-0C-CD-02-00-00 01-0C-CD-02-01-FF 
 
A specific three digit hexadecimal virtual local area network (VLAN) identification 
number is also a part of the GOCB with the range of 000 to FFF. This is used to identify 
which VLAN the GOOSE message is been transmitted to. The priority of the GOOSE 
message can be determined by a specific VLAN priority number, which is a decimal 
value with a range from 1 to 7. Messages with a priority from 1 to 3 are considered low 
priority messages, and messages with a priority from 4 to 7 high priority messages.  
Also an application identity number (APPID) has to be part of the GOCB. That is a 
unique hexadecimal value for sending the GOCB within the network. It identifies the 
dataset and GOOSE message. APPID has a hexadecimal range of 0000 to 3FFF.  
In  order  to  ensure  the  arrival  of  the  GOOSE message,  it  is  sent  multiple  times  on  
fast intervals. The multiple transmissions are depicted in Figure 8, where vertical lines 
present GOOSE messages send by the publisher.  
 
 
Figure 8. Transmission of GOOSE messages. [8] 
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When no data change occurs, the GOOSE message is transmitted periodically 
according to set MaxTime. Periodic transmissions enable the monitoring of GOOSE 
communication. When one or several of the data attributes within the GOOSE dataset 
change, the first transmission with the updated data values is send within the configured 
MinTime. After the first transmission the same GOOSE message is retransmitted a 
number of times until the stable condition time is achieved. This enables the supervision 
of GOOSE communication, which was not possible with hardwired solutions. The 
receiver can detect communication losses if the periodically sent message disappears. 
The actual detection of communication loss is detected according to a parameter called 
TimeAllowedToLive. The relation between this parameter and MaxTime is not defined 
in the standard, and is therefore manufacturer and product specific. MinTime and 
MaxTime are defined in the GOCB. Values for MinTime and MaxTime are application 
specific, for example 10 and 1000 milliseconds respectively. [8]  
3.3.4. Substation Description Language 
A substation automation system is typically project specific, and the introduction of 
IEDs has generated a need for propriety software tools for configuration of the IEDs. If 
interoperability has to be maintained, a standardized format for configuration data of 
both substations and IEDs is essential. Therefore, for describing and configuring an 
SAS, a specific Substation Configuration Description Language (SCL) has been defined 
in IEC 61850-6. The actual syntax of SCL is defined with Extensible Markup Language 
(XML). The XML-schema enables to automatically check the data contained in the 
different configuration files described below. 
An illustration of the engineering process of an IEC 61850 based SAS is presented 
in Figure 9. As depicted in the figure, the engineering process needs different software 
tools in order to define the specification of a substation, the characteristics of an IED 
and the complete SAS including data and communication models. These programs 
produce different kind of files, each using SCL as an interface providing basis for 
continuous engineering. There are four separate file types in the IEC 61850 series, 
which are described next.  
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Figure 9. Engineering process of an IEC 615850 based SAS. [17] 
 
The Substation Specific Description (SSD) is a file used to specify the structure of 
the electrical switchyard. This type of file is needed when data has to be exchanged 
from  a  system  specification  tool  to  a  system  configuration  tool.  The  file  contains  all  
required logical nodes and describes a single line diagram of the substation. Also, all the 
needed data type templates and the logical node type definitions are contained in the 
file. 
The IED Capability Description (ICD) describes data model and communication 
services of an IED in question. This information is exchanged from an IED 
configuration tool to the system configuration tool, and it contains the information and 
communication facilities available in the IED. With an ICD-file the system engineer can 
parameterize communication messages between IEDs.  
For a complete description of an SAS, including data and communication models, 
the Substation Configuration Description (SCD) is needed. This type of file is required 
for data exchange from the system configuration tool to the IED configuration tool. The 
SCD file contains all IEDs, substation description section and communication 
configuration defining properties for the sending and receiving devices.  
Finally, for the data exchange from the IED configuration tool to the actual IED 
within a project, the Configured IED Description (CID) is required. This file is 
dedicated to a project specific IED, containing all configuration data for fluent operation 
of the IED. [18; 19] 
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3.4. Network 
In order to establish a communication network for an SAS described in the IEC 61850 
series, certain issues concerning the network have to be decided. The standard defines 
qualities required for the performance of the network. Other issues not defined by the 
standard include network topology, cyber security and reliability of the network. The 
issues  related  to  the  network  are  presented  next,  as  they  are  as  important  for  the  
functionality of the SAS as the definitions of data modeling and communication 
services within an IED.  
3.4.1. Network Topologies 
A communication network can be established by using different network topologies. 
There are three basic topologies, namely bus, star and ring. In reality these topologies 
can be implemented with numerous variations and hybrids of the three. Different 
topologies offer different redundancy and performance for the network. In this chapter 
basic network topologies and few common variations suitable for substation LAN are 
presented. 
In the bus topology each switch is connected to the previous or next switch via one 
of its ports, often referred to as uplink ports. These ports are usually operating at higher 
speed than the ports connected to the IEDs. An example of bus topology is illustrated in 
Figure 10. Although the bus topology is cost effective, it has two major disadvantages. 
When the number of switches connected to the bus increases, the delay between the first 
 
  
Figure 10. An example of bus topology. [20] 
 
and last switch increases as well. The worst case delay, also referred as latency, should 
always be considered. The latency of the bus topology can make it not suitable for time-
critical applications, for instance GOOSE messages. Another disadvantage is that bus 
topology has no redundancy. If one of the connections between switches is lost, 
communication to every IED downstream from that connection is also lost. [20] 
The  ring  topology  offers  more  redundancy  compared  to  bus,  as  the  last  switch  is  
connected back to the first, as pictured in Figure 11. The ring topology forms a loop in 
the network, which requires the use of managed switches. The switches should support 
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol, which is depicted in Chapter 3.4.2. In ring topology one 
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of the switches is configured as backup switch, which breaks the loop in the network. If 
one of the connections between switches is lost, the backup switch will establish 
connection via another route. This way some redundancy can be achieved. However, if 
one of the switches is lost, the communication to all IEDs connected to that switch is 
also lost. The advantage of ring topology is improved redundancy in a cost effective 
way. It still has the same disadvantage with latency as the bus topology. The added 
complexity and cost of managed switches can also be seen as a disadvantage. However, 
in the context of this study this is irrelevant, as all switches within the IEC 61850 
communication network have to be managed, as depicted later on. [20]  
 
 
Figure 11. An example of ring topology. [20] 
 
In the star topology all switches are connected to a backbone switch, thus forming a 
star configuration as illustrated in Figure 12. This topology offers the best latency 
compared to others, since communication between any two IEDs can be established via 
the backbone switch. However, it has no redundancy. If one of the switches fails the 
communication to IEDs connected to that switch is lost, or if the backbone switch fails, 
all the switches are isolated. [20] 
 
 
Figure 12. An example of star topology. [20] 
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In order to improve redundancy and latency the basic topologies can be merged. 
Basically any combination of topologies can be applied, but in this study two possible 
combinations to improve redundancy are presented. A fault tolerant hybrid topology, as 
illustrated in Figure 13, can offer enhanced redundancy by implementing two parallel 
star topologies connected to form a ring. [20] 
 
 
Figure 13. An example of fault tolerant hybrid topology. [20] 
 
This kind of hybrid topology can tolerate certain faults, as depicted on Figure 13. 
Nevertheless, switches connected to IEDs are not redundant, thus communication faults 
can affect the performance of an SAS. By duplicating each switch and connection in the 
network a high redundancy can be achieved. This requires dual Ethernet ports in the 
 
Figure 14. An example of duplicated high redundancy topology. [20] 
 
 25 
IEDs, as each IED is connected via two separate links to the network. This kind of 
topology can tolerate any fault related to network equipment, as illustrated in Figure 14. 
Only the failure of an IED will isolate that particular IED from the network. Of course 
in critical applications this kind of failure has to be taken into account in the application 
itself, for instance by backup protection. [20] 
3.4.2. Component Features 
The IEC 61850 defines Ethernet as the physical layer of the OSI-model. The use of 
Ethernet  requires  that  all  IEDs  are  physically  connected  to  an  Ethernet  switch.  These  
connections form a Local Area Network (LAN), which the IEC 61850 uses for 
communication. Ethernet is based on frames of information, which can be sent to the 
LAN  at  any  time.  In  order  to  meet  the  real-time  control  requirements  of  an  SAS,  
Ethernet switches need to conform to certain features. These features offer advanced 
functions for layers 2 and 3 of the OSI model.   
The IEEE 802.3x Full-Duplex operation on all ports makes sure that no collisions 
appear between the transmitted frames. This is achieved by a store and forward process 
within the Ethernet switch. The received packets are first buffered in the memory of the 
switch, placed in a queue, and then transmitted one by one as they reach the front of the 
queue. This makes Ethernet much more deterministic than the previous methods used 
for collision detection. The Full-Duplex operation can be found in unmanaged switches. 
However, for all other features required of the switches a managed switch is required. 
Therefore, only managed switches should be used with IEC 61850. [20; 21]   
In order to ensure that time-critical information can pass through the switches 
without additional delay due to store and forward process, the IEEE 802.1p Priority 
Queuing  has  to  be  implemented  within  the  switches.  This  feature  allows  frames  to  be  
tagged with different priority levels, allowing the frames with the highest priority to 
bypass the buffered memory of the switch, therefore eliminating additional delay. This 
means  that  priority  tagged  GOOSE  messages  are  placed  in  front  of  the  store  and  
forward queue. The transmission of any frame is not interrupted when a priority tagged 
frame arrives in front of the queue. The priority tagged frame is just simply transmitted 
next. [20; 21] 
The VLAN defined in IEEE 820.1Q allows to logically separate network to virtual 
LANs. This means that the same physical network sharing cabling and infrastructure 
can contain several VLANs. The different VLANs are indentified by the switches with a 
tag  header  on  the  Ethernet  frame.   Each  VLAN has  its  own broadcast  domain,  which  
means  that  Ethernet  frames  from  one  VLAN  will  not  be  transmitted  onto  another  
VLAN. Different communication traffic of the IEC 61850 substation network can be 
segregated into separate VLANs. These separate VLANs could be used for instance to 
substation LAN management, MMS communication, GOOSE messages and sampled 
values in IEC 61850 network. The advantages of VLANs concerning GOOSE include 
restricted access to VLAN for GOOSE, and preserving free bandwidth as only GOOSE 
messages  are  allowed  to  use  the  specific  VLAN.  The  use  of  VLANs  in  GOOSE  
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communication is not mandatory, and is thus decided by the designer. It can be enabled 
by configuring the specified VLAN identification in the GOOSE control block, and by 
configuring same VLAN to switches in the network. [20; 21] 
To achieve network redundancy some form of ring topology has to be applied. 
However, if a physical loop occurred in an Ethernet network, the first broadcasted frame 
would consume all available bandwidth by circulating endlessly in the loop. This is 
prevented by Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP), defined in IEEE 802.1w. The 
RSTP puts certain links in the network into a backup state, which means that no traffic 
is allowed to flow across the link. This way any physical loops in the network are 
disconnected. The RSTP enables this by forming a logical tree network including all 
switches in the network. If network problems occur, the backup links are re-enabled in 
order to restore communication of all devices. This happens automatically within 
milliseconds and it works on any network topology. The RSTP also supports 
interoperability. Therefore, switches from different vendors can be implemented in the 
network. The RSTP has been enhanced by proprietary protocols. However, as they are 
not standardized solutions, they are not presented in this study. [20; 21] 
The Internet Grouping Message Protocol (IGMP) Snooping/Multicast filtering 
allows the sending of multicast frames in the network, which are then filtered and 
assigned to those IED’s which request them. In IEC 61850 station bus GOOSE 
messages are sent as multicast frames, hence the requirement for IGMP is justified. [12; 
15] 
An important protocol related to redundancy is called Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP). This protocol enables to verify the redundancy of the network in 
regular intervals. Therefore, any faults related to the network can be detected and 
recovered in order to maintain the redundancy of the network. [2] 
3.4.3. Data Transfer Medium 
The IEC 61850 defines Ethernet as a standard medium for the communication. Ethernet 
supports both widespread CAT5/RJ45 copper cabling and fiber optics. However, IEC 
61850 does not specify whether copper or fiber optics should be used. This creates a 
technological and economical dilemma, as fiber optics has technical advantages but also 
a higher cost compared to copper cabling. Fiber optic cabling is immune to 
electromagnetic interference (EMI), which makes it well suitable for substation 
environment. Other advantages of fiber optics include ability to span long distances and 
maintain extensive bandwidth. The problem between copper and fiber cabling can be 
solved by a compromise. Copper interconnections between IEDs and Ethernet switches 
can be used for instance between bays and to use fiber to connect switches between 
switchgears.  This  compromise  can  be  justified  by  the  fact  that  IEDs  within  a  bay  are  
usually located inside the switchgear where connections are relatively short, therefore 
inducting less EMI to copper cabling. In the field of process industry electrification 
IEDs and Ethernet switches are usually located in metal enclosed cabinets. This creates 
a Faraday shield which removes EMI within the cabinet. The use of copper cabling in 
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such  cases  is  therefore  further  justified.  However,  the  designer  of  the  network  should  
always compare between costs saved versus reliability and criticality of the electrical 
system.  
Fiber optics has two basic types available in the market. These are multi-mode and 
single-mode fiber. A multi-mode fiber requires less expensive light source, but has 
limitations regarding distance and bandwidth. It can reliably carry signal over a distance 
of two kilometers at bandwidth of 100 Megabytes Per Second (MBPS) or 300 meters at 
1000 MBPS. The single-mode fiber is more expensive as it requires a high quality laser 
light source. Its advantage is that it allows nearly infinite bandwidth with distances 
exceeding 100 kilometers. [21] 
3.4.4. Information Security 
When communication is performed via network, information security has to be 
considered. Generally information security of an SAS has been achieved by physically 
isolating the communication network from Wide Area Networks (WANs). Together 
with restricted access to the substation facility the isolation provides effective means to 
implement a required security level, as only authorized personnel are allowed to gain 
access to the network components. Access to network components should be restricted 
also  within  the  substation,  in  order  to  avoid  unintentional  access  to  networks  with  
critical tasks, such as networks used for IEC 61850-communication. In electrification of 
process industry, this means that the IEC 61850 network is situated in the same facilities 
as the switchgear equipment. However, interconnections to WANs might be required, 
for instance to provide customer support via internet. Usually this is done by a 
controllable switch, so that the owner of the switchgear can decide whether external 
communication is allowed or denied. If such interconnections are allowed, the 
substation LAN becomes vulnerable for attacks. 
The IEC 61850 standard does not define information security, although it uses 
common protocols, such as Ethernet and TCP/IP, for data transmission. The IEC TC 57 
recognized a need for another standard to specify security issues that would encompass 
the IEC 61850 series. This led to the development of IEC 62351, which covers security 
issues for IEC 60870-5, IEC 60870-6 and IEC 61850 series. Security for IEC 61850 is 
presented in part 6 of the IEC 62351 standard. For security issues concerning GOOSE 
the standard states that applications requiring multicast addressing and 4ms response 
times should not be encrypted. Instead, a communication path selection process should 
be used, which means that GOOSE messages should be restricted to a logical substation 
LAN. [22; 23] 
Substation LAN should be designed as a private network, however, interconnections 
to WANs might be required, thus making the substation LAN vulnerable for attacks. 
The interconnections to WANs are enabled via a gateway. The gateway should provide 
security by using a firewall and an encrypted Virtual Private Network (VPN). However, 
it should be stated that because GOOSE does not use TCP/IP protocol, it is not possible 
to  send  GOOSE  messages  trough  a  gateway.  Therefore,  possible  harm  to  GOOSE  
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communication via a gateway can only be produced by reducing available bandwidth. 
This problem can be resolved by using encrypted VLANs, which secure configured 
bandwidth for each VLAN. [22; 23] 
Information security can be further improved via layered security. Managed 
switches offer several means to implement this. By using VLANs, critical applications 
can be isolated in the same physical network. Switches can also have so called managed 
security by means of SSL/SSH. Independent port security and IEEE 802.1x can be 
deployed to deny physical access to the network. This means that only recognized 
computers can be connected to the network. The IEC 62351 working group is exploring 
more methods for making IEC 61850 and GOOSE messages more secure. [21]  
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4. APPLICATIONS OF GOOSE 
Horizontal communication has a variety of possible applications in substation 
automation. Based on the input from the project team, only the most relevant 
applications for ABB Process Industry’s PDC-solutions are considered. This input 
consists  of  prior  experience  and  solutions  used  in  customer  projects.  The  selection  of  
applications was also affected by the fact that the implementation should be possible 
with ABB’s REF615 IEDs.  
4.1. Process Industry Electrification 
Process industry in general refers to metal-, petrochemical- and forest industry. ABB 
Process Industry is specialized in electrification and instrumentation of pulp and paper 
factories. The variety of completed customer projects is large, including both greenfield 
and renovation sites. From the perspective of electrification, each project is unique and 
the scale varies substantially. An overview of process industry electrification equipment 
is presented in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. A general overview of process industry electrification. 
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Typically industrial power systems have relatively high short-circuit currents and 
the  power  density  of  the  system  is  high.  Most  of  the  load  consists  of  electric  motors  
with a majority of asynchronous motors. This can create disturbances in the power 
system if adequate filtering is not implemented. In order to ensure the persistence of the 
industrial process different control and data acquisition systems need to be 
implemented. These include systems for power distribution control and process 
automation. [24] 
In complete electrification of a pulp and paper factory the scope of the project is 
vast.  Electrification starts with the energy production, which can be done either locally 
or via a distribution network. If the required energy is produced locally by generators, 
they require adequate protection. Energy can also be transferred from power plants via 
transmission lines, which requires substation with either Air-Insulated Switchgear (AIS) 
or Gas-Insulated Switchgear (GIS).  In the transmission level reactive power 
compensation might also be required by local distribution company. Electrical energy is 
transferred from the generators or switchgear trough transformers to Medium Voltage 
(MV) switchgears. The MV switchgear supplies power to MV motors and possibly to 
MV frequency converters. Adequate protection for motors is required, and the use of 
frequency converters usually demands harmonic filtering. From the MV switchgear 
power is further supplied to Low Voltage (LV) switchgear via distribution transformers. 
The LV switchgears provide power to LV motors and other process equipment, for 
instance instrumentation devices. Instrumentation and its requirements are beyond the 
scope of this study.  
Trough the complete chain of power distribution, adequate protection and control of 
the equipment must be provided. This means that the power system is safe to use and it 
can isolate faults preferably without interrupting critical processes. The designing of a 
dependable power system is always a task of economical optimizing. This means that a 
certain amount of interruptions must be tolerated, because a totally dependable system 
would be too expensive. In process industry electrification even short interruptions in 
power distribution can cause substantially long or expensive interruptions in the 
industrial process. [24] 
The presented power system requires a control and monitoring system, possibly with 
an interface to local power company’s control system. An interface with process 
automation control system is often required as well. This creates challenges for the 
engineering of communication, as different control systems need to be able to exchange 
information.  
4.2. Conventional Solution 
Information exchange between bay level devices is conventionally realized by 
hardwiring. This means that any information which should be transferred to another 
IED is assigned to an output contact. The terminals of this output contact are then wired 
to an input in the receiving IED. The functions of the inputs are configured in the 
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receiving IED by using proprietary configuration software. The principle of hardwiring 
is to use specific wiring for every transferred signal. As a number of inputs and outputs 
are needed to interact with the circuit breakers, disconnectors and earth switches, the 
use of hardwiring is limited to the available number of inputs and outputs of a given 
IED.  
 
 
Figure 16. An example of horizontal communication via hardwiring. 
 
An example of a hardwired solution can be illustrated by a simple blocking scheme, 
which is presented in Figure 16. If any of the feeder IEDs, for example IED 1 detects an 
overcurrent situation, the start signal of overcurrent protection is transferred upstream to 
IED 0 via hardwiring marked with red lines. This signal can then be used to block the 
fast stage overcurrent protection in the incomer IED 0, allowing the feeder IED 1 
enough time to  send  a  trip  signal  for  clearing  the  fault.  Without  the  blocking  scheme,  
the upstream IED 0 would detect the overcurrent and send a trip signal, which would 
interrupt power flow for all feeder IEDs. Therefore, blocking can reduce the size of the 
affected area in fault situations. However, in order for the blocking application to work, 
the overcurrent start signal will have to be hardwired from all feeder IEDs, therefore 
resulting in a lot of assembly work and wiring.   
When the number of IEDs increases, the number of individual wires becomes 
excessive due to the information exchange required between all relays taking part in the 
blocking application. Within an SAS there can be a number of other applications, which 
require horizontal communication between IEDs. Typical signals between switchgear 
bays include breaker, disconnector and earth switch status signals, service and 
interlocking position information, and protection start signals. Hardwiring is also used 
for signaling to and from external systems, for example Remote Terminal Units (RTU) 
or other automation systems. As well as the signals between bays, current, voltage and 
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power measurements are transferred. This is often the case in process industry 
electrification, where process automation and SAS have interfaces.  
4.3. GOOSE Solution 
The purpose of GOOSE messages is to replace hardwired signals by unambiguously 
naming all elements of data and then transferring this data via Ethernet network station 
bus. This is illustrated in Figure 17 with a similar scheme as presented in the previous 
chapter. The use of GOOSE can be achieved by using the object model of substation 
information, which is described in IEC 61850-7-4. When the object oriented data model 
is used, each data attribute will have a unique name in the whole substation, and thus the 
subscriber and publisher of this data will know where it originated. Required data for 
certain application can be organized and transferred as GOOSE message.  
 
 
Figure 17. An example of horizontal communication via GOOSE 
 
The configuration of GOOSE messages is done by using proprietary software tools. 
The desired data attributes are attached into a dataset, and this dataset is then configured 
to be sent as a GOOSE message. The sending of a dataset via GOOSE needs specific 
GOOSE  Control  Block,  where  essential  information  regarding  GOOSE  traffic  is  
presented. Detailed description of GOCB is presented in Chapter 3.3.3. The subscribers 
of the GOOSE message are also defined in the configuration process. Information sent 
via GOOSE needs to be configured in the receiving IEDs to perform the desired 
function. This is done by virtually connecting the signals inside the IED and configuring 
them to perform desired application. After the configuration is done, the information of 
the SCD file is  uploaded separately into IEDs. All  IEDs within the substation need to 
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get this information, therefore the proprietary software tools must be able to import the 
SCD file into the IEDs via network. Finally the physical connections have to be 
established by implementing Ethernet switches and cabling between substation IEDs. 
The requirements for network components are described further in Chapter 3.4.2. 
4.4. Benefits of GOOSE 
Extensive hardwiring of signals creates significant cost in switchgear installations. The 
amount of hardwiring required for typical 10-bay medium voltage switchgear 
installation is pictured in Table 8. When the amount of hardwiring needed is so vast, it 
becomes apparent that the use of GOOSE communication can significantly reduce costs 
in switchgear installations. [25]  
 
Table 8. I/O wiring in conventional hardwired medium voltage switchgear. [25] 
Number of IO wires Between protection 
and control devices 
Between other 
devices 
Total 
Inter-bay signaling 104 116 220 
Automation system 85 47 132 
Other external 
systems 
383 252 635 
Total 572 415 987 
 
An important characteristic of GOOSE is that communication is monitored. As 
presented in Chapter 3.3.3 GOOSE messages are sent periodically even if no data 
change occurs. If these periodically sent messages disappear, the loss of horizontal 
communication can be detected. In conventional solutions, failure in the communication 
can be detected either in regular testing, or when an application fails to work. The 
period for regular tests is from one to three years depending on the customer. Thus in 
practice the communication is not monitored at all in hardwired solutions. In GOOSE 
based solutions communication failures can be detected within seconds, depending on 
the IEDs.  
Other benefits of GOOSE include the expandability of the SAS without additional 
hardwiring between IEDs. New hardwiring is only required between process equipment 
and the implemented IEDs. Similarly, new applications or modifications to existing 
applications can be implemented without incremental hardwiring, as required data can 
be transferred via GOOSE. 
4.5. GOOSE Applications 
Different protection and control applications, which can be realized by using GOOSE 
communication, are presented in the following chapters. Each application is first 
described in general, and then the functions and signals required for GOOSE solution 
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are presented. The functions and signals are defined according the IEC 61850 standard. 
The signals are presented in tables, for example Table 9. These tables state the name of 
the GOOSE publisher IED and the name of the GOOSE subscriber including the 
function block input where the GOOSE signals needs to be connected. On the third 
column a general description of the signals is given followed by an example of the 
required data attributes for ABB’s REF615 IED’s. The underlined parts of the name 
path are defined by the standard, whereas other parts can be chosen by the vendor, in 
this case ABB. The data attributes for each signal were found by investigating the 
appropriate LN for the application from the IEC 61850. Manuals for REF615 IEDs were 
also used as a source in order to create examples of the applications. By examining the 
list of data classes defined for that LN the correct data objects were selected. Similarly, 
the data classes have defined tables of data attributes, from which the proper attributes 
for each signal could be selected. Because the names of the LNs, data classes and data 
attributes are defined by the standard, they were easy to locate in the IED 
communication configuration software. 
 
Table 9. An exemplary table of the application signals. 
Publisher Subscriber Signal 
description 
Data attributes for REF615 
Publisher 
IED’s 
name 
Subscriber 
IED’s name 
Function Block 
Input 
General 
description  
LD.$$LN$$.DataClass.DataAttribute 
 
 
The REF615, which was selected for this study by the project team, is a dedicated 
feeder IED. It is designed for protection, control, measurement and supervision of utility 
substations and industrial power systems. The REF615 is designed according to IEC 
61850, therefore it fully supports GOOSE communication. The REF615 can be ordered 
in  six  different  variants  from  A  to  F,  which  all  include  a  different  standard  
configuration. The GOOSE communication is application specific, and therefore it has 
to be individually configured to IEDs depending on the application. In the following 
chapters selected applications for this study are presented, and the possible 
implementation with REF615 IEDs is given as an example.  
4.5.1. Bay Interlocking 
Switchgear interlocking is used to prevent switchgear operation, which could lead to 
malfunction or damage of primary switching equipment. This is achieved by comparing 
switch positions in related switches or disconnectors, and determining the individual 
interlocking conditions to switches according to logical rules. Based on the logical rules 
between switch positions, interlocking can either prevent or allows switching execution. 
The conditions for interlocking depend on the station configuration. In bay interlocking 
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only the switch positions in the same bay are evaluated, as presented in the following 
example. 
In order to provide safe working conditions for assembly or maintenance work in 
switchgear certain conditions have to be met. The switchgear must be isolated from the 
power system and it must be grounded. Generally, this means using two types of bay 
interlocking.  When  the  disconnector  is  closed,  the  closing  of  the  earth  switch  circuit  
breaker is locked. Another type of interlocking must be used when earth switch is 
closed, and the work in the switchgear is in progress.  In this case all disconnectors of 
lines capable of power feed to the line in question must be locked to open position. 
Therefore, the closing of related circuit breakers has to be locked. The status values of 
disconnectors and earth switches are conventionally hardwired in order to implement 
this type of interlocking applications. These values can be transmitted via GOOSE by 
using the signals provided in the logical node XSWI. These signals are presented in 
Table 10 with descriptions.  
 
Table 10. Signals for bay interlocking example. 
Publisher Subscriber Signal description Data attributes 
Infeed  
IED 0 
Feeder IED 1 
CBXCBR1 
BLK_CLOSE 
Disconnector position 
Position closed 
Position ok  
 
CTRL.DCSXSWI1.PosCls.stVal 
CTRL.DCSXSWI1.PosOk.stVal 
Feeder 
IED 1  
Infeed IED 0 
CBXCBR1 
BLK_CLOSE 
Earth switch position 
Position closed 
Position ok 
 
CTRL.ESSXSWI1.PosCls.stVal 
CTRL.ESSXSWI1.PosOk.stVal 
 
An example of bay interlocking is pictured in Figure 18. For simplicity, only one 
disconnector and one earth switch are presented. If the disconnector is closed, the 
Feeder IED1 controlling the earth switch needs the position closed and position ok 
signals from the Incomer IED0, which are depicted in blue color in Figure 18. The 
position ok signal means that the disconnector is not between positions, in other words 
the  information  is  valid.  If  either  of  the  signals  equals  true,  the  closing  of  the  related  
circuit breaker is locked. In the case of REF615 this is done by virtually connecting 
signals via a logical OR gate to CBXCBR1 function BLK_CLOSE input. Similarly, in 
the  opposite  case,  when the  earth  switch  is  closed,  the  Infeed  IED0 needs  the  signals  
stating  that  the  earth  switch  position  is  closed and ok. These signals are virtually 
connected via OR gate to the locking input of CBXCBR1.  
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Figure 18. Example of bay interlocking application. 
 
The control functions providing these signals are included in variants B, D, E and F 
of REF615. There are three functions for disconnectors and one for earth switch 
indicator. In the given example only one disconnector function is applied, the other two 
functions are separated by increasing the number after the LN.  
4.5.2. Inter-Bay Interlocking 
In interlocking schemes, where switch positions in other bays need to be taken into 
account the applications are referred to as inter-bay interlocking. Conventionally, an 
SAS is used for inter-bay interlocking schemes. In these schemes all feeder and bay 
controllers report the switch positions to a station controller, which then evaluates and 
defines interlocking conditions. In conventional designs, this leads to a vast amount of 
hardwiring.  
When  similar  schemes  are  realized  by  using  GOOSE,  the  switch  positions  can  be  
transmitted directly between bay controllers, as presented in Figure 19. The evaluation 
and definition of interlocking conditions can be done directly in the IEDs instead of the 
station controller. When switch positions are transferred as GOOSE messages, only the 
signals controlling the disconnectors remain hardwired. Therefore, the need of 
hardwiring is reduced. As interlocking schemes depend on station configuration, an 
overall description of transmitted signals is not possible. However, interlocking 
applications can be represented by the example depicted in Figure 19. In the example, 
interlocking is used to enable or interlock the circuit breaker QA1, which connects the 
two busbars. 
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Figure 19. An example of inter-bay interlocking application. 
 
In the IEC 61850 a logical node called SCILO is defined for interlocking purposes. 
However, this LN is not included in the REF615 IEDs and therefore they can only be 
used to send required information for interlocking function located in the bus coupler 
IED. The configuration of the interlocking logic to the SCILO LN is beyond the scope 
of this study. Instead, exemplary switching conditions for bus coupling disconnectors 
and circuit breaker are given in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Switching conditions for bus coupler bay. 
Switch and direction Interlocking conditions 
QA1 open not allowed if: 
((feeder 1A: QB1 = closed) AND 
(feeder 1A: QB2 = closed)) OR  
((feeder 2A: QB1 = closed) AND 
(feeder 2A: QB2 = closed)) 
QA1 close allowed if: 
the disconnectors of the bay are not 
between positions AND 
earthing switches QC1 and QC2 are 
open 
QB1 open / close allowed if: 
QA1 = open 
QB2 open / close allowed if: 
QA1 = open 
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For the given exemplary switching conditions, the signals presented in Table 12 
should be transmitted via GOOSE, in order to transfer required information for the 
interlocking scheme. Both feeder IEDs publish the status information of their 
disconnectors and earthing switches. As stated in Table 11, the opening of circuit 
breaker  QA1 is  not  allowed if  both  disconnectors  in  either  bay  1  or  bay  2  are  closed.  
Therefore, the data attributes CTRL.DCSXSWI1.PosCls.stVal and 
CTRL.DCSXSWI2.PosCls.stVal are included in the GOOSE message. In order to verify 
that disconnectors are not between positions the PosOk.stVal attributes are transferred. 
Similar attributes indicate that earthing switches are open and not between positions. 
Thus, all required information for this exemplary interlocking function is transferred via 
GOOSE. 
 
Table 12. Signals for inter-bay interlocking example. 
Publisher Subscriber Signal description Data attributes 
Feeder  
bay 1 
Bus 
coupler 
Disconnectors QB1 
and QB2 in bay 1 are 
closed and not 
between stages, and 
earthing switch QC1 
is open.  
CTRL.DCSXSWI1.PosCls.stVal 
CTRL.DCSXSWI1.PosOk.stVal 
CTRL.DCSXSWI2.PosCls.stVal 
CTRL.DCSXSWI2.PosOk.stVal 
CTRL.ESSXSWI1.PosOpn.stVal 
CTRL.ESSXSWI1.PosOk.stVal 
Feeder  
bay 2 
Bus 
coupler 
Disconnectors QB1 
and QB2 in bay 2 are 
closed and not 
between stages, and 
earthing switch QC2 
is open. 
CTRL.DCSXSWI1.PosCls.stVal 
CTRL.DCSXSWI1.PosOk.stVal 
CTRL.DCSXSWI2.PosCls.stVal 
CTRL.DCSXSWI2.PosOk.stVal 
CTRL.ESSXSWI1.PosOpn.stVal 
CTRL.ESSXSWI1.PosOk.stVal 
 
In real interlocking applications the number of required position signals is often 
vast. For simplicity, the number of signals was kept low in this example. The REF615 
IEDs do not have the required logical node SCILO for creating interlocking logic. 
However, standard configurations B, D, E and F have the required control functions for 
transferring disconnector and earth switch positions. For the actual implementation of 
sophisticated interlocking schemes more complex IEDs, for instance RE_630, RE_650 
or RE_670 are required. 
4.5.3. Reverse Blocking 
Blocking applications are used to restrict a fault in the power system to a smaller area. 
One typical application is reverse blocking, which is used for high speed busbar 
protection. In reverse blocking the instantaneous overcurrent protection stage of an 
upstream incomer IED is blocked by a downstream feeder IED, which operates and 
isolates the fault. By blocking the fast operation of the incomer IED, the influence of the 
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fault can be limited to the feeding line where the fault occurred. If the feeder IED 
cannot isolate the fault, the incomer IED will clear the fault after the predefined delay of 
low stage overcurrent protection. The blocking signal is transferred in reverse direction 
compared to power flow, hence the name reverse blocking. Conventionally, this 
application needs hardwiring for each blocking signal from the feeder IEDs to the 
incomer IED. If the same application is realized with GOOSE, the blocking signals can 
be transmitted via GOOSE messages. In IEC 61850 the logical node PTOC is defined 
for time overcurrent protection. Depending on proprietary solutions, the PTOC LN can 
have more than one function with different operation time characteristics. For example, 
in ABB’s REF615 IEDs, there are four PTOC functions for non-directional overcurrent 
protection. These are named PHLPTOC1, PHHPTOC1, PHHPTOC2 and PHIPTOC1 
for low, high and instantaneous stages respectively, including two instances for high 
stage. The following example uses these function blocks in order to demonstrate a 
reverse blocking application, as depicted in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20. Example of reverse blocking application. 
 
When one of the feeder IEDs high stage overcurrent protection function detects a 
fault,  the  start  signal  is  sent  via  GOOSE  to  incomer  IED  0.  This  start  signal  is  
configured to block the instantaneous stage overcurrent protection in IED 0, and 
therefore  the  feeder  IED  has  a  chance  to  clear  the  fault  by  tripping  related  circuit  
breaker. If this does not clear the fault, the high stage overcurrent protection of the 
incomer IED will operate, and clear the fault after the configured delay time. The use of 
reverse blocking can thus potentially minimize the impact of a fault.  
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Table 13. Signals for reverse blocking example. 
Publisher Subscriber Signal description Data attributes 
Feeder 1 Incomer IED 
PHIPTOC1 
BLOCK 
Start signal of high stage 
non-directional 
overcurrent protection 
LD0.PHHPTOC1.Str.general 
Feeder 2 Incomer IED 
PHIPTOC1 
BLOCK 
Start signal of high stage 
non-directional 
overcurrent protection 
LD0.PHHPTOC1.Str.general 
 
The signals required for the presented example are listed in Table 13. The required 
function of non-directional overcurrent protection is available in standard configurations 
A to E of REF615 IEDs. 
4.5.4. Breaker Failure Protection 
When an IED detects a fault in the power system, it will operate and send a trip signal to 
the circuit breaker. Under normal conditions the circuit breaker will open and isolate the 
fault from the power system. Thus the operation of a circuit breaker is essential for the 
protection function to perform as desired. If the circuit breaker fails to operate, the fault 
can cause further damage or threat the stability of the power system. In order to avoid 
this, a breaker failure protection can be implemented. This is achieved by monitoring 
the time delay between the trip signal and the actual opening of the circuit breaker. If 
the fault current has not been interrupted within a set time delay from the circuit breaker 
trip, the breaker failure protection is initiated. This is realized by sending a trip signal to 
adjacent circuit breakers in order to ensure that the fault is isolated. This trip signal can 
be sent via GOOSE communication.  
 
Table 14. Signals for circuit breaker failure example. 
Publisher Subscriber Signal description Data attributes 
Feeder 1 Incomer IED 
TRPPTRC1:1 
TRIP 
Signal for external 
backup trip 
LD0.CCBRBRF1.OpEx.general 
Feeder 2 Incomer IED 
TRPPTRC1:1 
TRIP 
Signal for external 
backup trip 
LD0.CCBRBRF1.OpEx.general 
 
In ABB’s REF615 there is a specific function for circuit breaker failure protection, 
the CCBRBRF, which is based on the RBRF logical node defined in IEC 61850. The 
function is available in all standard configurations of REF615. This function has two 
independent timers for re-tripping. One timer is for internal re-trip of its own breaker 
and another for external back-up trip. The required signals for external upstream trips 
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are listed in Table 14. This signal can be configured in the receiving IED to perform 
tripping of related circuit breaker. An illustration of the example is given in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21. An example of circuit breaker failure protection. 
 
In the presented example both feeder IEDs have circuit breaker failure function. In 
case of breaker failure, the function will try to re-trip the circuit breaker after the initial 
trip signal has failed. If the re-trip signal cannot isolate the fault, the function will send 
back-up trip signal to upstream incomer IED. This signal is configured in the incomer 
IED to trip the related circuit breaker. The breaker failure protection is useful for 
achieving the n-1 criterion, which means that the fault is cleared from the system even if 
one component fails to clear the fault. 
4.5.5. Fault Arc Protection 
Fault arc protection is used to detect arc situations in air insulated metal-clad 
switchgear, which can be caused by insulation breakdown during operation or human 
errors during maintenance. According to IEC 61850, the arc protection is realized by 
protection logical node SARC. This LN is used as a function, which monitors phase and 
residual  currents  and  can  detect  light  either  locally  or  remotely  in  order  to  make  
accurate decisions on ongoing arc situations. When an arc situation is detected, the 
function sends trip signal to the related circuit breaker. However, if the arc is located 
upstream in relation to power flow direction, the circuit breaker cannot isolate the fault. 
This can also be the case if the arc is located within the circuit breaker compartment. In 
these cases, the arc protection IED can send fault arc detection signal to upstream IED 
which can isolate the fault by opening the related circuit breaker. This signal can be sent 
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by using GOOSE. The upstream IED is also equipped with SARC function and the arc 
fault detection can be used as an input in remote light detection. In order to avoid 
unnecessary tripping, it is convenient if the arc protection IED has different light 
sensors. These sensors can be installed, for example, in the busbar compartment, the 
breaker compartment or the cable compartment of the switchgear. 
 
 
Figure 22. Example of fault arc protection application. 
 
In the REF615s the fault arc protection is available as an optional function in all 
standard configurations. As depicted in Figure 22, the REF615 has three different light 
sensors for the fault arc detection. In the given example the sensors are placed in the 
cable compartment, the circuit breaker compartment and the busbar compartment. If one 
of the feeder IEDs detects an ongoing arching situation in either sensor 1 or 2, the IED 
sends a GOOSE message to the upstream incomer IED. Because the sensors one and 
two are in the busbar and the circuit breaker compartment, the feeder IED cannot isolate 
the fault. The fault arc detection signal is transferred to incomer IED, where it is 
virtually connected to the related ARCSARC function as remotely detected arc fault. 
Together  with  phase  current  values  the  function  concludes  that  there  is  an  arching  
situation,  and  opens  the  circuit  breaker.  The  result  is  the  same  whether  the  light  is  
detected with sensor 1 or sensor 2. 
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Table 15. Signals for fault arc protection. 
Publisher Subscriber Signal description Data attributes 
Feeder 1 Incomer IED 
ARCSARC1 
REM_FLT_ARC 
ARCSARC2 
REM_FLT_ARC 
Fault arc detected: 
Light sensor 1 
 
Light sensor 2 
 
LD0.ARCSARC11.FADet.stVal 
 
LD0.ARCSARC21.FADet.stVal 
Feeder 2 Incomer IED 
ARCSARC1 
REM_FLT_ARC 
ARCSARC2 
REM_FLT_ARC 
Fault arc detected: 
Light sensor 1 
 
Light sensor 2 
 
LD0.ARCSARC11.FADet.stVal 
 
LD0.ARCSARC21.FADet.stVal 
  
The required signals for this example are listed in Table 15. Arc fault protection was 
selected by the project team as the application that would be demonstrated and tested as 
a part of this study. Therefore, detailed description of the configuration and testing of 
transferred arc protection trip is presented in Chapter 5.  
4.5.6. Triggering of Disturbance Recording 
When  a  fault  occurs  in  a  power  system,  a  disturbance  record  from  a  time  period  
including values prior and after the fault can be very useful on order to analyze why the 
fault occurred. In IEC 61850 a dedicated LN is defined for disturbance recording, which 
is  named  RDRE.  This  LN  describes  basic  functions  of  the  disturbance  recorder.  For  
consistent modeling, the disturbance recorder function is decomposed into one LN class 
for analogue channels and one LN class for binary channels, named RADR and RBDR 
respectively.   
In IEDs the triggering of disturbance recording can be configured to happen 
automatically, for example when a trip signal is commenced. In some cases it would be 
useful to have disturbance records from other parts of the power system as well, in order 
to  see  how  the  fault  has  affected  them.  The  triggering  of  these  recordings  can  be  
achieved by GOOSE communication. For instance, the trip signal of an IED can be send 
via  GOOSE  to  adjacent  IEDs,  and  this  signal  can  be  used  as  a  trigger  of  disturbance  
recording.  
In the example pictured in Figure 23 the start signals of overcurrent protection are 
being used to trigger the disturbance recorder in the incomer IED. The standard defines 
PTOC function for non-directional time overcurrent protection. In REF615 IED’s there 
are low stage, high stage instance 1, high stage instance 2 and instantaneous stage 
functions for non-directional time overcurrent protection. The functions are named 
PHLPTOC1, PHHPTOC1, PHHPTOC2 and PHIPTOC1 respectively. The non-
directional overcurrent protection functions are available in standard configurations A to 
E. In standard configuration F overcurrent protection is directional, and its functions are 
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named DPHLPDOC1, DPHLPDOC2 and DPHHPDOC1, with two instances for low 
stage. The instantaneous stage remains non-directional, therefore the PHIPTOC1 
function is used. These functions have similar data attributes for GOOSE 
communication, thus only non-directional functions are presented in this example.  
Start signals of all three stages are transferred via GOOSE to the upstream IED as 
pictured in Figure 23. If the disturbance records are required only from actual fault 
situations,  the  operate  signal  of  the  protection  functions  can  also  be  used.  In  this  case  
the last two parts of the transferred data attribute’s name would be changed to 
Op.general. 
 
 
Figure 23. Example of disturbance recorder triggering.  
 
In REF615 IEDs the disturbance recorder has up to 12 analog and 64 binary signal 
channels. This function is available in all standard configurations. The triggering of 
these channels can be done in several ways. The analog channels can be triggered on 
limit violations, and the binary channels on state changes. Both channel types can also 
be triggered periodically or manually. The manual triggering can be done via a 
parameter called trig recording. The trig recording can be configured to start via local 
human machine interface (HMI) or GOOSE communication. If GOOSE communication 
is used, the incoming signal is virtually connected to one binary input, which triggers 
the recording for all configured channels. It would be convenient to use one binary input 
for all trigger signals transferred via GOOSE. In this example channel one is chosen, as 
depicted by C1 in Figure 23. 
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Table 16. Signals for triggering of disturbance recorder. 
Publisher Subscriber Signal description Data attributes 
Feeder 1 Incomer 
IED 
RDRE:1  
C1 
Time overcurrent 
protection star signal: 
Instantaneous stage, 
High stage instance1, 
High stage instance2, 
Low stage 
 
 
LD0.PHIPTOC1.Str.general  
LD0.PHHPTOC1.Str.general 
LD0.PHHPTOC2.Str.general 
LD0.PHLPTOC1.Str.general  
Feeder 2 Incomer 
IED 
RDRE:1  
C1 
Time overcurrent 
protection star signal: 
Instantaneous stage, 
High stage instance1, 
High stage instance2, 
Low stage 
 
 
LD0.PHIPTOC1.Str.general  
LD0.PHHPTOC1.Str.general 
LD0.PHHPTOC2.Str.general 
LD0.PHLPTOC1.Str.general  
 
Table 16 presents exemplary signals for disturbance recorder triggering. In this 
example the start signals of time overcurrent protection are used. The start signals of all 
four instances are transferred via GOOSE to the incomer IED. These signals are then 
virtually connected through a logical OR gate to RDRE:1 channel C1. Thus any of the 
signals will trigger the disturbance recorder.  
4.5.7. Future Applications 
The use of IEDs supporting IEC 61850 enables the implementation of several protection 
and control applications via GOOSE. The applications presented in this study were 
selected because they are relevant for ABB Process Industry, and can be realized with 
ABB’s REF615 IEDs. However, with more sophisticated IEDs the possibilities of 
GOOSE based applications increase. Two possible applications for future research are 
shortly presented below. 
When two circuits with different power sources are connected through impedance, a 
Synchronism Check (SC) is required. In IEC 61850 a specific logical node, RSYN, is 
defined to perform as an SC function. The RSYN function monitors the conditions on 
both sides of a breaker, and verifies that conditions are safe before closing the breaker. 
The verification of synchronism is done by comparing the voltages on both sides of the 
breaker. The difference in magnitude, phase angle and frequency has to be within 
certain limits, in order to maintain the stability of the power system and minimize 
possible internal damages. The IED which compares the voltages requires magnitude, 
phase angle and time stamp of all phase voltages, as pictured in Figure 24.  
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Figure 24. An example of synchronism check 
 
In the presented example bus has two possible feeders, a generator or transmission 
line. When the generator is, for instance, under maintenance and the power feed needs 
to be transferred to transmission line, a synchronism check is required. The SC IED 
subscribes the line voltages from the line protection IED as an analogue GOOSE 
message. The challenge of analogue GOOSE messages is the time synchronization of 
the network. In order to provide accurate information, the time difference in the network 
should be less than one microsecond. [27] The bus voltages are transferred straight from 
a bus VT via conventional hardwiring. The RSYN function compares the difference of 
the  values,  and  decides  whether  the  closing  of  the  circuit  breakers  is  safe  or  not.  
However, this application requires the use of more complex IEDs including the RSYN 
function, and is not presented in detail in this study. 
Another application where GOOSE could be implemented is transformer differential 
protection. According to IEC 61850, a logical node PDIF is defined for differential 
protection. In this scheme differential protection IED requires three phase currents from 
the High Voltage (HV) and LV sides of the transformer. Depending on the grounding 
method the residual current of the transformer might also be needed. Based on this 
information the differential protection IED can decide whether a fault is inside its 
protection  zone  or  not.  The  currents  from  LV  side  and  residual  current  of  the  
transformer can be transferred to the differential protection IED via GOOSE as 
presented in Figure 25. The LV side protection IED publishes three phase current values 
as GOOSE message and the differential protection IED subscribes it. If a neutral point 
earth-fault IED is required, it publishes residual current as GOOSE message and the 
differential protection IED subscribes it.   
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Figure 25. An example of differential transformer protection. 
 
Both of the presented future applications extend the use of GOOSE to transfer 
measurement values. In the IEC 61850 standard sampled values are defined for this 
purpose. However, the sampled values are defined to originate straight from the process 
equipment, i.e. current and voltage transformers with native IEC 61850 support. 
Because such instruments are not yet available in the market, the presented schemes can 
only be implemented by using either GOOSE or hardwiring to transfer measurement 
values. According to ABB experts, applications utilizing GOOSE for transferring 
measurement values are currently being evaluated. Similarly, the performance of 
presented schemes should be tested before actual implementation.  
4.6. Reliability and Redundancy 
The requirements for the reliability of an SAS are described in IEC 61850-3 Clause 4. 
These requirements refer to IEC 60870-4, which specifies performance requirements for 
a telecontrol system. In IEC 60870-4 different properties, which influence the 
performance of a system, are defined and classified. These properties include concepts 
of reliability, availability, maintainability, security and integrity. According to IEC 
61850-3, any single point of failure should not cause the substation to be inoperable.  
[26] This means that all components, including those used only for communication, 
should be reliable enough to meet this demand.  
The concept of reliability is defined as the measure of a system to perform its 
intended function under specified conditions for a specified period of time. The 
reliability can be described by Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), which means the 
statistical period of time in hours between any component failure in the system. From 
MTBF values of a component a failure rate can be calculated by dividing the number of 
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failures with the time taken into consideration. If no valid data is available, failure rate 
can be estimated as inverse MTBF, as shown in Formula 1. [27] 
 
MTBF
Fr 1?          (1) 
For a complete system the failure rate can be calculated from the individual 
components. If the components are in series, the total failure rate is the sum of the 
components’ failure rates. If the components are parallel the MTBF values can be added 
together, resulting to smaller failure rate. The total failure rate and total MTBF of a 
system can be calculated according to these rules. Other indicators of redundancy can be 
calculated with these values.  
The concept of availability is defined as the ability of a unit of a system to perform 
its function on a given instant. The availability is a probability figure, which concerns 
operation on a given instant, whereas reliability concerns operation over a given time 
period. Availability A can be calculated if the uptime and the downtime of the system 
are known, as presented in Formula 2.  
 %100
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According to IEC 60870-4, the Formula 2 is applicable if there are statistics from a 
period of twelve months regarding the equipment and six months regarding the system. 
If these times are not known, the predicted availability Ap can be calculated by using the 
MTBF and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). The predicted availability can be calculated 
with Formula 3. [27] 
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The concept of maintainability is  described as the ability of a system to restore its  
operation and maintain it under normal working operations after detection of a fault. 
Maintainability is expressed in hours by Mean Time To Restoration (MTTR), which 
means the sum of different tasks required to restore the operation of the system.  
In this context the concept of security means that any single component failure 
should not result in a critical failure in the system. In GOOSE communication this can 
be achieved by applying redundant network topologies, as described in Chapter 3.4.1. 
Solutions concerning information security are presented in Chapter 3.4.4. [27] 
The term data integrity is defined as the unchangeability of information between a 
source and a destination. Data integrity with GOOSE is guaranteed by sending the 
message several times, as presented in Figure 8 earlier in this study. With the GOOSE 
message a specific quality bit is also published, thus the subscriber can detect whether 
the information in the GOOSE message is valid or not.  
The most relevant meters for redundancy and reliability are MTBF and availability 
values. During this study reliability information concerning GOOSE communication 
was acquired. An Excel template, which calculates the reliability, availability and 
MTBF  of  the  whole  system,  was  created  based  on  the  MTBF  values  and  number  of  
components. The template was excluded from this report, as it is only valid to 
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components used by ABB Process Industry. In order to improve redundancy in GOOSE 
applications, the best practices are redundant network topologies and redundant 
components.  
4.7. Testing 
In order to assure the functionality of horizontal communication, both the products and 
implementation regarding GOOSE communication should be tested. The general 
classifications of quality tests are defined in IEC 61850-4. A more detailed presentation 
of conformance testing is presented in Part 10 of the standard. In the IEC 61850-10 
specific test cases for GOOSE communication are introduced. Products with native IEC 
61850 should pass all these tests, in order to show conformance to IEC 61850. 
However, the conformance testing of individual products is out of the scope of this 
study. Hence the focus is in the testing of functionality of applications, which are 
project specific. The IEC 61850-4 states that when a new SAS is introduced, the system 
integrator is responsible for testing all functions. The term system integrator refers to a 
turnkey deliverer of an SAS. The testing is carried out by the representatives of the 
system integrator and the customer in optional Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) and 
mandatory Site Acceptance Test (SAT). The FAT is described as the functional tests of 
an SAS manufactured according to customer specification. This means that the 
parameters of the SAS are set according to the planned applications. The FAT can be 
carried out in the facilities of the manufacturer or other agreed location by using process 
simulating test equipment. When the actual installation of the SAS is completed, further 
testing of the functionality of the SAS is accomplished trough mandatory SAT. The 
SAT  is  defined  as  the  verification  of  each  data  and  control  point  and  the  correct  
functionality within the SAS and also between the SAS and its operating environment. 
The  SAT  is  carried  out  in  the  whole  installed  plant  by  using  the  final  parameters  as  
defined in the customer specification. [28; 29] 
4.7.1. Testing Software 
In GOOSE applications it is possible to send messages by using dedicated software 
which use the configuration files of the IEDs. Thus the simulation of substation events 
is  not  mandatory.  Naturally  for  the  testing  of  overall  performance  of  the  SAS  the  
simulation is essential. However, if only GOOSE needs to be tested, dedicated software 
is sufficient.  
For this purpose there are vendor based programs available, such as Omicron’s 
IEDScout and ABB’s Integrated Testing Toolbox (ITT). The configuration files of the 
IEDs can be loaded into these programs either from database or straight from the IEDs. 
The programs can then create virtual IEDs based on the configuration files and send 
related GOOSE messages to the network. The functionality of these messages in the 
receivers can then be verified. A detailed description of the functionality and use of 
these programs is beyond the scope of this study.    
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4.7.2. Testing Method 
The GOOSE applications presented in this study have to be tested in FAT and SAT tests 
before actual operation. This can be achieved by simulating the related process events 
and verifying the desired operation of the SAS. This should be done similarly as when 
testing hardwired solutions. First the connections to process level equipment in all IEDs 
are verified. This means the hardwired connections to voltage and current transformers, 
as well as connections to circuit breaker trip coils.  
The performance of applications utilizing horizontal communication is tested by the 
following method. The required output of IED’s function block is manually activated by 
using IED’s local HMI. The output signals from a function are transferred via GOOSE 
or hardwire. The transferred signals are connected to function blocks in the receiving 
IEDs, where they should activate certain outputs. The receiving function blocks are 
accessed via local HMI and the required outputs verified. This procedure is repeated to 
all applications. As all connections to process equipment were verified at the beginning, 
the performance of applications utilizing horizontal communication is also verified. By 
using this procedure, the configuration of GOOSE in the sending IEDs is verified by 
activating the correct function block. The connection to receiving IEDs is verified. And 
finally the configuration of receiving IEDs is verified.  
4.8. Documentation 
A substation automation system forms a complex entity with vast amount of equipment, 
wiring and signals. Therefore, a detailed documentation of specific definitions of the 
SAS is required. The IEC 61850 defines references for SAS documentation in part 
61850-4. According to the standard, required SAS documentation can be divided into 
two separate groups, hardware documentation and parameter documentation. The 
hardware documentation includes circuit diagrams, signal lists and function diagrams 
for external equipment. The circuit diagrams should describe links between SAS 
components and their connections with the primary process equipment. The parameter 
documentation consists of configuration list, signal lists and parameter lists. Graphical 
displays and operation menu sequences as well as function diagrams for internal 
features such as IED internal function blocks should be included in the parameter 
documentation. The interfaces between hardware and parameter documentation are the 
signal lists, which should have identical identifiers in both documentations. [29] 
4.8.1. Relevant Documentation 
A complete description of SAS documentation is beyond the scope of this study, but 
documentation concerning GOOSE is an essential part of GOOSE based applications. 
The hardware documentation should include all equipment related to GOOSE. In circuit 
diagrams this means all IEDs, Ethernet switches and related wiring needed to establish 
GOOSE communication. All relevant documentation concerning this equipment should 
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also be included in the hardware documentation, in other words manuals and technical 
information about the equipment. Hardware documentation does not require much 
additional work compared to hardwired solutions. The role of parameter documentation 
becomes essential when GOOSE based solutions are applied in an SAS. Primarily, all 
information regarding GOOSE is stored in the SCD files of the SAS. Thus updated 
backup SCD files are an essential part of the documentation.  
4.8.2. Signal Lists 
In order to provide readable documentation about GOOSE, specific signal lists with 
functional descriptions should be provided. These lists should present the publishers and 
subscribers of GOOSE messages with reference to parameter and configuration lists. An 
example of such a list is given in Table 17.  
 
Table 17. An example of GOOSE message signal list. 
Publisher Signal 
description 
Data attributes GOOSE 
APPID 
Function 
block input 
Subscribers 
Name of 
the 
publisher 
IED 
General 
description 
of the data 
being 
transferred 
Complete 
names of the 
attributes in 
the data set 
The 
unique 
application 
ID of the 
GOOSE 
message 
The function 
block and the 
name of the 
input where 
the message 
is connected 
Names of 
the 
subscriber 
IEDs 
Example 
publisher 
Example 
signal 
description 
Example data 
attributes 
Example 
GOOSE 
APPID 
Example 
function 
block input 
Example 
subscribers 
REF615_26 Arc light 
detection 
signal, 
sensor 1 
LD0. 
ARCSARC11. 
FADet.stVal 
0001 ARCSARC1. 
REM_FLT_DET 
REF615_25 
 
Table 17 provides all the information regarding GOOSE communication that is 
necessary for the person responsible for GOOSE configuration. When the configuration 
is done, more detailed information can be found in the backup SCD files. 
4.8.3. Logical Diagrams 
The documentation should also provide description of the applications within the SAS. 
With applications utilizing GOOSE this can be achieved, for instance, by logical 
diagrams as pictured in Table 18. The functionality of the application is presented with 
logical  operators,  presenting  an  overview  of  the  logic  and  signals  required  for  the  
applications. As the GOOSE APPID is unique within the system, it links the logical 
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diagram to  the  signal  lists.  A logical  diagram presents  the  overall  functionality  of  the  
application more illustratively than mere signal lists. 
 
Table 18. An example of GOOSE message logical diagram. 
 
 
Documentation of horizontal communication is needed in the engineering, 
configuration and testing phases of an SAS project. Further on, documentation is 
assigned to the customer during commissioning. The presented examples of signal lists 
and logical diagrams have all necessary information regarding GOOSE based solutions. 
However, ABB Process Industry suggested that when GOOSE is implemented in 
interlocking applications the relevant information regarding GOOSE should be 
documented in interlocking diagrams. Similarly, when GOOSE is used in protection 
applications, GOOSE documentation should be implemented in protection diagrams. 
Thus the information regarding GOOSE would be documented where it is most likely 
needed. However, this is a vendor specific solution, and therefore it is not presented in 
this study.   
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5. APPLICATION TEST 
In the following chapters an example case of GOOSE based application is given. First 
the general idea of the selected fault arc protection is described. The equipment used in 
the test is presented, followed by a detailed description of the configuration process with 
ABB’s products. Finally, the operation of the application is presented.  
5.1. Application Tested 
The fault  arc  protection  was  chosen  as  the  application  to  be  tested  on  the  basis  of  an  
upcoming customer project, which requires applying of GOOSE communication to fault 
arc protection scheme. The purpose of the test is to describe how fault arc protection 
with two IEDs can be realized with ABB’s products and software tools. The idea of the 
application is similar to the example presented in Chapter 4.5.5, and is pictured in 
Figure 26.  
 
 
Figure 26. Tested fault arc protection application. 
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When the downstream Feeder IED detects an ongoing fault arc situation in the 
busbar compartment it cannot isolate the fault. If the arc is detected in the breaker 
compartment, the breaker might be damaged and the isolation of the fault is not 
possible. Therefore, the detection of arc fault in these two compartments is transferred 
to upstream Incomer IED, which can isolate the faults by operating the related breaker. 
The Incomer IED sends the trip signal based on the externally detected light signal and 
locally sensed overcurrent. In this test the load is assumed to be capable of injecting 
short-circuit current to the arc fault location. Therefore, both of the IEDs are designed to 
send trip signals if arc fault is detected in busbar or breaker compartment. 
In real cases there would be more loads and more feeder IEDs to protect them. 
However, the configured signals for similar arc protection scheme would be the same, 
therefore using only one feeder IED is justified.  
5.2. Test Equipment 
The application test was conducted with two ABB’s REF615 relays, equipped with 
optional arc protection. The arc protection includes three light sensors, which are able to 
detect ongoing arc situations. In order to establish GOOSE communication, an Ethernet 
network was created. The test equipment with IP addresses is illustrated in Figure 27. 
The network equipment included one managed Ethernet switch, three RJ-45 LAN 
cables and a configuration computer. The required programs for configuring ABB 
products were included in the laptop that ABB provided for the testing.  
 
 
Figure 27. Test equipment for fault arc protection. 
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Programs include the PCM600, which is a configuration software designed for 
substation automation. In the PCM600 the layout of the substation is defined by 
creating required voltage levels and bays. Required IEDs are created in the PCM600 
project, and the correct parameters and settings for the IEDs are defined. Also, the 
required connections of incoming and outgoing signals between the IEDs function 
blocks are defined by using a specific Signal Matrix Tool (SMT).  
Another program called Communication Configuration Tool (CCT) is needed for 
defining horizontal communication. The required datasets and GOOSE control blocks 
are created in the CCT, as well as the subscribers of the GOOSE messages.  
In  order  to  power  up  the  IEDs and  simulate  current  to  incomer  IED,  a  simulation  
device SIM600 was introduced. The SIM600 supplied direct current for the IEDs. A 
powerful flashlight was also required to simulate the arc flash of fault arc situation. 
5.3. Configuration Description 
In order to create a test network, the IP-addresses for the REF615 IEDs were manually 
configured via local HMI. The IP-address and the sub-network mask of the 
configuration computer were also changed in order to create a functional LAN. After 
this the IEDs and computer were connected to the Ethernet switch by using a star 
topology. The connections were verified by using the command interpreter (CMD) in 
the configuration computer. It can be launched by choosing Start > Run and typing cmd 
to the Run-window. The communication settings of the computer can be printed to the 
CMD by typing ipconfig. The IP-address and sub-network mask of the computer were 
printed as shown in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28. Screenshot from CMD. 
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The connections between the computer and the IEDs can be verified with ping-
command. For instance, by typing ping 172.16.4.25 the connection between the 
computer and the incomer IED can be tested. Similarly, all connections within the same 
network  can  be  tested  when  the  IP-addresses  are  known.  This  testing  is  based  on  
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo request tool, which uses TCP/IP. The 
tool sends ICMP packages to the target IP-address, and monitors the replies to these 
packages. If all four reply packages return from the target IP-address, the connection is 
functional, as shown in Figure 28. 
5.3.1. Configuration in the PCM600  
The configuration of an SAS project begins by defining the layout of the substation in 
the PCM600. The engineering starts by creating a new project in the PCM600. For this 
test a project called Arc_Test_PCM was created. After this, required substations, voltage 
levels, bays and IEDs can be created. A new substation can be added in the Project 
Explorer – window by right clicking over the project name and choosing New > 
General > Substation. The voltage levels are added similarly by right clicking over 
Substation and choosing New > General > Voltage level. After this bays are added in 
similar fashion under Voltage Level. Finally, the IEDs are added with a right click over 
Bay and choosing New > Feeder IEDs > REF615.  
For the purpose of this test a simple layout was created including one substation and 
one voltage level. Two bays were created within the voltage level, each containing one 
REF615 IED. When an IED is created in the PCM600, it can be configured online or 
offline. In online configuration the PCM600 will retrieve the order code of the IED and 
automatically  generate  functions  for  the  IED.  This  is  done  with  the  help  of  a  wizard  
window, which only requires the IP-address of the IED.  When the functions have been 
generated, the IED is ready for application specific configuration. Similar procedure has 
to be repeated in order to create another REF615 IED to the substation. The final plant 
structure of the PCM600 project is depicted in Appendix 4. 
5.3.2. Configuration in the CCT 
The configuration of GOOSE communication for ABB’s IEDs is done in separate 
software called CCT. The project created in PCM600 has to be exported and then 
imported to CCT. The file being exported is an SCD file, it contains all information 
regarding the substation description and IEDs. In CCT the imported SCD file shows the 
data structure of the substation as a logical tree. The GOOSE configuration is done in 
the IED section of CCT. There all IEDs described in the SCD file are presented by their 
technical keys, which are unambiguous within the project. Technical keys used in the 
test are pictured in Figure 27, REF615C_26 for the sending IED and REF615F_25 for 
the receiving IED. 
The GOOSE configuration is done first for the sending IED. By navigating to the 
logical device LD0 and logical node LLNO, the actual GOOSE configuration can be 
 57 
done in the IEC61850 Data Engineering window. The specific dataset is first created in 
the Dataset Engineering tab by clicking New Dataset. In this test the dataset was named 
Arc_DS. All required data attributes are then added to the created dataset by choosing 
them from the Data Model column and clicking Add. In this case, the data attributes are 
the arc detection signals, which are listed in Table 19. The created dataset is presented 
in Appendix 5. 
 
Table 19. Configured data attributes. 
Publisher Subscriber Signal description Data attributes 
Feeder IED 
REF615C 26 
Incomer IED 
REF615F 25 
 
Fault arc detected 
Light sensor 1 
Light sensor 2 
Light sensor 3 
 
LD0.ARCSARC11.FADet.stVal 
LD0.ARCSARC21.FADet.stVal 
LD0.ARCSARC31.FADet.stVal 
 
When the required data attributes are added, the dataset needs a GOOSE control 
block. This is done in the Goose Control Engineering tab. By clicking GSE Control, a 
new GOCB can be configured. First the GOCB was named Arc_GOCB and the correct 
dataset selected. By clicking Address Definition CCT automatically creates all other 
required information, which is confirmed in a pop-up window. The values used in this 
test are pictured in Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29. Values for GOCB. 
 
The GOCB for this GOOSE message is now defined. The subscriber of the message 
is added by dragging it from the Project Navigator window to the upper right corner of 
the GOCB, which is depicted by the cursor arrow in Figure 29. If more than one 
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subscriber is required, they can be added similarly by using drag-and-drop. The 
subscribers are show in Figure 29 under Client IED heading.  
Now all required information for the GOOSE message is defined. The created 
information has to be updated to the SCD file. This is done by choosing Tools > 
IEC61850 Data Flow Engineering > Update dataflow. After the update, the created 
GOOSE message and the related data attributes are visible in the subscriber IED’s 
logical node LLNO as inputs. The CCT project should be saved at this point. 
5.3.3. Parameterization and Uploading 
Before  the  application  is  operative,  certain  parameters  have  to  be  defined  and  the  
configuration loaded to IEDs. This is done in the PCM600 program, thus the SCD file 
must be exported from the CCT back to PCM600. This is done by choosing Tools > 
SCL Import/Export > Export SCL File. The exported file is imported to the PCM600 by 
right clicking over Substation and selecting Import. After importing the SCD file with 
GOOSE configuration, it is available for further configuration.  
The created GOOSE message has to be connected to desired functions in the 
subscriber IED. This is done in SMT, which is opened by right clicking over the 
subscriber IED and selecting Signal Matrix Tool. The SMT shows all binary inputs, 
binary outputs and functions of the IED in spreadsheets. All connections between the 
inputs, outputs and functions are made virtually in these spreadsheets. The created 
GOOSE message is visible in the Binary Inputs tab. Each data attribute appears as one 
binary input, and each of them can be connected to a desired function. In the arc 
protection test, the fault detection signals from sensors 1 and 2 are designed to result in 
a  trip  in  the  incomer  IED.  Therefore  signals  ARCSARC11.FADet.stVal and 
ARCSARC21.FADet.stVal are virtually connected to the ARCSARC1 REM_FLT_DET 
and ARCSARC2 REM_FLT_DET as pictured in Appendix 4. The remotely detected 
light signals operate as inputs of the incomer IED’s arc protection function.  
 In order to easily notice whether a GOOSE signal is received in the subscribing 
IED all three signals are configured to turn on a led in the front cover of REF615C_25. 
Configuration is done in SMT by first connecting signals to a generic timer function 
called TPGAPC4:4 via logical OR gate. The timer function is then connected to the led 
number 11 on the binary outputs tab. Every time the configured GOOSE message is 
received, the led number 11 will lit according to the default time set in the TPGAP4:4. 
When the configuration in the SMT is done, the changes made are automatically saved 
to the configuration file by closing the SMT. 
The parameterization of the IEDs is also done in the PCM600. Parameterization 
means the configuration of application specific values and settings, for example the start 
level of overcurrent protection. Parameterization is done by browsing to the correct 
function in the Project Explorer. The arc protection functions for the Feeder IED are 
found with the following path, REF615C_26 > Application Configuration > Settings > 
Other Protection > ARCSARC11 and ARCSARC21.  The  parameter  settings  can  be  
opened by a right click over the correct function. For this test example it was merely 
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checked that the operation mode for functions ARCSARC11 and ARCSARC21 was Light 
+ Current and the start value was 2.5 times the nominal current. In this mode the arc 
protection function needs both light and overcurrent signals in order to send a trip signal 
to circuit breaker. The light signal can either come from IED’s own sensors or as 
remotely detected light, as in this example. When the Parameter Settings window is 
closed, the changes are automatically saved to the configuration file.  
Finally, the completed configuration needs to be written to IEDs. This is done 
separately for each IED by right-clicking over them in the Project Explorer and 
selecting Write  to  IED. When the new configuration is uploaded to IEDs, they will 
automatically  reboot  in  order  for  the  new  settings  to  come  into  operation.  After  
rebooting the IEDs are operative including the created GOOSE communication.  
5.4. Test 
In order to test the created application and GOOSE communication, an overcurrent 
signal was simulated with SIM600 and the light sensors were simulated with flashlight. 
The light sensors for arc detection are equipped with automatically compensated 
reference level in order to prevent unfounded operation. The light sensors are covered 
with black dust caps, thus each sensor could be tested separately. When overcurrent and 
light flash in front of light sensor one were simulated, the outcome was tripping of both 
IEDs,  as  designed.  Similar  results  were  achieved  by  simulating  light  sensor  two.  The  
flashes were so fast that the configured led only flashed quickly, unless the light in front 
of the sensors was left on. Because the fault detection signal of light sensor three was 
not connected to trip function in the Incomer IED, the simulation of sensor three only lit 
the led number 11 as configured. In the Feeder IED the simulation resulted in tripping, 
as designed. 
The performance of GOOSE communication was not subjected to study because 
ABB has tested the performance of REF615 IEDs with KEMA. The conclusion of these 
tests is that REF615 complies with performance class P1 for type 1A – Fast messages. 
This means that the total transmission time of the GOOSE message is below 10 
milliseconds, as defined in IEC 61850-5. [16; 30] 
5.5. Problems in the Configuration 
During the testing process several problems with configuration were encountered. Most 
of them were human errors caused by lack of experience. However, the use of two 
different programs for GOOSE configuration was found cumbersome by all members of 
the  project  team.  The  team  members  found  importing  and  exporting  the  SCD  file  
between programs confusing. Therefore, the integration of PCM600 and CCT would 
rationalize the configuration process.  
Some problems could be traced as actual software bugs, which were reported further 
on.  One  of  the  bugs  discovered  in  CCT was  related  to  a  parameter  called  Config.Ref, 
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which is included in every GOCB. The configuration reference is automatically 
increased, if any changes are made to the GOOSE message. The Config.Ref has to be 
same in the sending and receiving IEDs, otherwise the GOOSE message will be 
ignored. When the dataset was changed, and the configuration file written to both IEDs, 
the Config.Ref parameter in the subscribing IEDs was not changed automatically. Thus 
the subscribers did not accept the incoming GOOSE message, as the Config.Ref 
parameters did not mach. This problem could be avoided by deleting the GOCB and 
creating it again. However, it should be possible to make changes to an existing GOOSE 
message. The problem was reported further on, and will be taken into account in the 
next version of CCT. 
Another problem related to configuration files was found in other IED’s. If the 
configuration file was uploaded straight from the IED, it did not include the GOOSE 
configuration. Therefore, if any changes to the configuration are required, they should 
be done to the original file, and uploaded to IED. Otherwise the configured GOOSE 
messages are lost. 
The problems found indicate that the usability of the programs and IEDs requires 
development. The bugs that were found will be fixed in the next versions of the 
programs. However, all these problems can be avoided, if the configuration process is 
familiar and the bugs known. Therefore, adequate training and practice is essential in 
engineering of GOOSE based applications. 
 61 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to investigate possible applications of GOOSE 
communication for ABB Process Industry’s electrification solutions. The customers 
have not yet requested GOOSE based applications, but a few pilot projects including 
GOOSE have been realized. As the IEC 61850 becomes more common in the field of 
substation automation, it is highly likely that the standard will become a prominent 
solution for process industry customers.  
The selected applications were presented with example signals for ABB’s REF615 
IEDs. Because the logical nodes are named according to IEC 61850, the presented 
applications can be implemented similarly with other ABB IEDs equipped with required 
functions. Applications can be implemented with other vendor products, although the 
complete signals names might change. 
Interviews with process industry specialists showed general interest concerning the 
possibilities of GOOSE communication. The IEC 61850 is seen as the standard defining 
communication in substations and beyond. The next editions of the standard will 
include more specifications concerning reliability of the communication and extending 
the scope of the standard to hydro and wind power generation. However, with GOOSE 
based applications most experts are still waiting for more reference cases in order to be 
convinced  of  its  performance.  It  can  therefore  be  suggested,  that  GOOSE  
communication is first implemented to less time critical applications, such as 
interlocking. With the experience gained from these pilot projects, the use of GOOSE 
can be further extended. If the IEDs conform to IEC 61850, and the requirements of the 
standard are taken into account in the network structure, GOOSE can be implemented to 
more demanding and critical applications as well. 
As mentioned above several problems were encountered during the configuration of 
GOOSE based application. This indicates that the configuration programs need to be 
developed in order to provide more user friendly programs in the future. Compared to 
conventional hardwired schemes, GOOSE based applications require new type of 
configuration work. Unfortunately, not a lot of experience has been gained in this area 
so far. One of the advantages of GOOSE is the cost saved by using less labor intensive 
hardwiring. Initially the use of GOOSE might be more expensive if the costs related to 
training and learning are taken into account.  In the long run the use of GOOSE is more 
cost effective, as the configuration process becomes part of the engineering. Further 
benefits  can  be  achieved  via  expandability  of  GOOSE  based  applications.  New  IEDs  
can be added or replaced without additional hardwiring. Instead the required signals can 
be  added  to  each  IEDs configuration  files.  The  challenges  of  GOOSE based  solutions  
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are related to redundancy, security and documentation of the applications. In order to 
provide reliable communication the network structure has to be designed with proper 
components, topology and required features. In the next edition of the IEC 61850 these 
matters will be taken into account in detail. The documentation of GOOSE applications 
requires new type of documents, as the signals between IEDs cannot be read from 
circuit diagrams. The configuration files need to have backups that are up to date with 
the system. GOOSE based applications require new type of training for service 
personnel, as horizontal communication is verified with programs instead of 
conventional metering. Adequate training of GOOSE is required also among engineers 
and sales personnel, in order to avoid false beliefs and resistance for change.  
As technology develops more IEDs with native IEC 61850-communication will 
become available in the market. With additional functionality in the IEDs more 
applications can be realized with GOOSE communication. The full potential of IEC 
61850 becomes topical when first process level devices with native IEC 61850-
communication are introduced to the market. This means that process level devices can 
transfer measurement values as SV messages via IEC 61850-network. This provides 
interesting topics for further study, as the process level devices can communicate to 
IEDs without hardwiring.  
Based on the interviews with experts, the common opinion in the industry is that 
IEC 61850 is the present and future standard for substation communication. This 
becomes topical in the field of process industry electrification when the customers 
become aware of the potential of IEC 61850. Therefore, it can be stated that IEC 61850 
will play a significant role also in the future of process industry electrification. 
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Appendix 1: Parts of the IEC 61850 
IEC 61850 - Communication networks and systems in substations 
Part Title 
IEC 61850-1 Introduction and overview 
IEC 61850-2 Glossary 
IEC 61850-3 General requirements 
IEC 61850-4 System and project management 
IEC 61850-5 Communication requirements for functions and device models 
IEC 61850-6 Configuration description language for communication in electrical 
substations related to IEDs 
IEC 61850-7-1 Basic communication structure for substation and feeder equipment 
– Principles and models 
IEC 61850-7-2 Basic communication structure for substation and feeder equipment 
– Abstract communication service interface (ACSI) 
IEC 61850-7-3 Basic communication structure for substation and feeder equipment 
– Common data classes (CDC) 
IEC 61850-7-4 Basic communication structure for substation and feeder equipment 
– Compatible logical node classes and data classes 
IEC 61850-8-1 Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) – Mappings to 
MMS (ISO/IEC 9506-1 and ISO/IEC 9506-2) and to ISO/IEC 8802-
3 
IEC 61850-9-1 Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values 
over serial unidirectional multi drop point to point link 
IEC 61850-9-2 Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values 
over ISO/IEC 8802-3 
IEC 61850-10 Conformance testing 
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Appendix 2: Guide for the Reader 
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The “x” means that this part of the IEC 61850 should be read. 
The “in extracts” means that extracts of this part of the IEC 61850 series should be read to 
understand the conceptual approach used. 
The “-“ means that this part of the IEC 61850 may be read. 
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Appendix 3: Table of Logical Nodes 
Group A  Automatic control (4) 
ANCR  Neutral current regulator 
ARCO  Reactive power control 
ATCC  Automatic tap changer control 
AVCO  Voltage control 
Group C  Supervisory control (5) 
CALH  Alarm handling 
CCGR  Cooling group control 
CILO  Interlocking 
CPOW  Point-on-wave switching 
CSWI  Switch controller 
Group G General references (3) 
GAPC  Generic automatic process control 
GGIO  Generic process I/O 
GSAL  General security application 
Group I Interfacing and archiving (4) 
IARC  Archiving 
IHMI  Human machine interface 
ITCI  Telecontrol interface 
ITMI  Telemonitoring interface 
Group L System logical nodes (3) 
LPHD  Physical device information 
CLN  Common logical node 
LLN0  Logical node zero 
Group M Metering and measurement (8) 
MDIF  Differential measurements 
MHAI  Harmonics or interharmonics 
MHAN  Non phase related harmonics or interharmonics 
MMTR  Metering 
MMXN  Non phase related measurement 
MMXU  Measurement 
MSQI  Sequence and imbalance 
MSTA  Metering statistics 
Group P Protection functions (28) 
PDIF Differential 
PDIR  Direction comparison 
PDIS  Distance 
PDOP  Directional overpower 
PDUP  Directional underpower 
PFRC  Rate of change of frequency 
PHAR  Harmonic restraint 
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PHIZ  Ground detector 
PIOC  Instantaneous overcurrent 
PMRI  Motor restart inhibition 
PMSS  Motor starting time supervision 
POPF  Over power factor 
PPAM  Phase angle measuring 
PSCH  Protection scheme 
PSDE  Sensitive directional earthfault 
PTEF  Transient earth fault 
PTOC  Time overcurrent 
PTOF  Overfrequency 
PTOV  Overvoltage 
PTRC  Protection trip conditioning 
PTTR  Thermal overload 
PTUC  Undercurrent 
PTUV  Undervoltage 
PUPF  Underpower factor 
PTUF  Underfrequency 
PVOC  Voltage controlled time overcurrent 
PVPH  Volts per Hz 
PZSU  Zero speed or underspeed 
Group R Protection related functions (10) 
RDRE  Disturbance recorder function 
RADR  Disturbance recorder channel analogue 
RBDR  Disturbance recorder channel binary 
RDRS  Disturbance record handling 
RBRF  Breaker failure 
RDIR  Directional element 
RFLO  Fault locator 
RPSB  Power swing detection/blocking 
RREC  Autoreclosing 
RSYN  Synchronism-check or synchronising 
Group S Sensors and monitoring (4) 
SARC  Monitoring and diagnostics for arcs 
SIMG  Insulation medium supervision (gas) 
SIML  Insulation medium supervision (liquid) 
SPDC  Monitoring and diagnostics for partial discharges 
Group T Instrument transformer (2) 
TCTR  Current transformer 
TVTR  Voltage transformer 
Group X Switchgear (2) 
XCBR  Circuit breaker 
XSWI  Circuit switch 
Group Y Power transformer (4) 
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YEFN  Earth fault neutralizer (Petersen coil) 
YLTC  Tap changer 
YPSH  Power shunt 
YPTR  Power transformer 
Group Z Further power system equipment (15) 
ZAXN  Auxialiry network 
ZBAT  Battery 
ZBSH  Bushing 
ZCAB  Power cable 
ZCAP  Capacitor bank 
ZCON  Converter 
ZGEN  Generator 
ZGIL  Gas insulated line 
ZLIN  Power overhead line 
ZMOT  Motor 
ZREA  Reactor 
ZRRC  Rotating reactive component 
ZSAR  Surge arrestor 
ZTCF  Thyristor controlled frequency converter 
ZTCR  Thyristor controlled reactive component 
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Appendix 4: Screenshot from PCM600 
 
 
 72 
Appendix 5: Screenshot from CCT 
 
